30 Ukrainian thought leaders thanked the Slovak people for ammunition for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Open letter)

8 days ago, the Slovak public, on the initiative of the Peace to Ukraine ((Mier Ukrajine) organization, started raising funds for ammunition for Ukraine, thus joining the Czech initiative “Darček pre Putina”.

In 8 days, the Slovaks have already raised almost 3.5 million euros, which is an unprecedented amount. More than 54 thousand Slovaks have already joined the campaign. And these numbers are growing every minute.

In response, the Institute for Central European Strategy initiated a public letter of gratitude to the Slovak people and invited 30 Ukrainian opinion leaders to support it.

Open letter to the Slovak people

Dear people of the Slovak Republic, dear Otto, all those who initiated, are supporting and have already contributed to the fundraising for ammunition for Ukraine organized by the Mier Ukraine team!

Dear friends! We in Ukraine are humbled, touched, and incredibly grateful for your support at this extremely difficult time for the Ukrainian people, Europe, and all of humanity.

We, Ukrainians, did not initiate, did not want, and still do not want this war, we strive for peace like no other. But this is our war, a war for the right to live, for Ukraine’s independence, for freedom and for Europe. At this tragic and crucial time, we are happy to know that the Slovak people, each of you, have been standing by our side, helping us, since the first day of this unprovoked genocidal Russian aggression.

It is not even about the figures, although today when every bullet and shell is fateful for Ukraine, 3 million euros raised by almost 50,000 Slovaks in only a few days is an impressive and inspiring story that demonstrates wisdom, strength, and unity of Slovak civil society.

But most importantly, it is about the choice made by the Slovak people, each and every one of you, to support the Ukrainian political nation in its struggle for what unites all peoples of goodwill. We want you to be proud of yourselves, and to believe in your strength and deeds.

Because you are on the right side of history. Together with you, we are creating a new history of Europe and the world.

Unfortunately, it is this war that has only recently made it possible for many of us to discover each other, Slovakia for Ukraine, and Ukraine for Slovakia.

Yet, the spirit of freedom and democratic values have always united us. We are not just neighbors, we are like-minded people, partners, and allies. Ukraine will never stop being grateful to the Slovaks, because what you are doing now is priceless.

Glory to the Slovak people! We thank you and we will repay your kindness!

List of signatories (in alphabetical order):

Yuri Andrukhovych, writer
Stanislav Aseyev, journalist, former captive of the “Izolyatsia” torture chamber in Donetsk, serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, leader of the “Okean Elzy” rock band, public figure
Serhiy Hakman, vice president of the “Social Resources and Initiatives” Charitable Foundation
Yaroslav Hrytsak, historian, professor at the Ukrainian Catholic University
Vitaliy Diachuk, serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, editor-in-chief at Infopost Media
Volodymyr Yermolenko, president of the Ukrainian PEN, philosopher
Serhiy Zhadan, writer, musician, volunteer
Oksana Zabuzhko, writer, philosopher
Joseph Zissels, public figure, co-president of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities (VAAD)
Pavlo Kazarin, journalist, serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Pavlo Klimkin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in 2014-2019
Yevhen Klopotenko, chef, restaurateur
Oleksandr Konotopskyi, founder of Ajax Systems
Andriy Lyubka, writer, editor-in-chief of the Re:Open Ukraine initiative
Myroslav Marynovych, former Soviet political prisoner, member of the “1st December” Initiative Group, advisor to the rector of the Ukrainian Catholic University
Oleksandra Matviychuk, human rights activist and head of the Centre for Civil Liberties, recipient of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize
Sevgil Musayeva, editor-in-chief of the “Ukrainska Pravda” online media outlet
Yuriy Nazaruk, co-founder of the “!FEST” Holding of Emotions, entrepreneur
Yuriy Panchenko, editor of the online outlet European Truth
Valeriy Pekar, lecturer at the Kyiv Mohyla Business School and the Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University
Vitaly Portnikov, political analyst, journalist, TV presenter
Serhiy Prytula, volunteer, founder of the Serhiy Prytula Charitable Foundation
Oleh Sentsov, Ukrainian filmmaker and military officer, former political prisoner of the Kremlin
Serhiy Sydorenko, editor of the “European Pravda” online media outlet
Oleksandr Sushko, executive director at the International Renaissance Foundation in Ukraine
Viktor Troshki, a soldier of the self-propelled artillery division of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade
Dmytro Tuzhansky, director of the Institute for Central European Strategy
Fedir Shandor, sergeant of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, “professor from the trench”
Pavlo Sheremeta, Minister of Economy of Ukraine in 2014, member of the GLOBSEC International Advisory Council

Hungarians of Zakarpattia region aspire to be ambassadors of Ukraine in the EU

It was 2021, I was on the train home from Kyiv, when my fellow passenger, having learnt that I was from Zakarpattia region, asked me “how are those separatist Hungarians doing there?”

I asked her what she thought of me in return. The woman replied: “Well, you seem like a nice, cultured person”. And I shot back: “Because I am one of the leaders of this group of ‘cannibalistic separatists’.”

Then I told my fellow passenger about the Hungarian community in Ukraine, about the multicultural peace in Zakarpattia, which is a historical example, and how, regrettably, a very toxic image of Hungarians has been formed in Ukraine over the past 5-7 years. We had a very interesting and friendly conversation for several hours.

It is only over the past two years, primarily owing to our Hungarian military personnel serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, that it has become clear to an increasing number of people that the Zakarpattia Hungarian national community differs in its mindset, needs and interests from Hungarian citizens, and even more so from Hungarian politicians.

We, the Transcarpathian Hungarians, live in Ukraine, work in the legislative field of Ukraine, and all our actions are aimed to ensure that our community feels comfortable in Ukraine, and that Ukraine is a sovereign, independent and prosperous European state.

Over the past few years, we have been involved in the development of Ukrainian legislation on national communities, including in terms of European integration requirements. Whenever various institutions of the Council of Europe, the EU, Hungary, or the state of Ukraine invite us as experts, we try to cooperate with all of them and share our expertise, because we are willing and able to be ambassadors for the sake of building bridges between them all. Our logic is that by striving for the best for the Hungarian community and defending its rights, we are also doing good for Ukraine as a future member of the EU and NATO.

I will be frank: when last November we, representatives of the Hungarian community of Zakarpattia, were received in Kyiv by the Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal to present the final drafts of the amendments to the legislation, I could not believe that this was really happening and that such substantive changes in Ukrainian legislation on minority issues were possible. I thought it was some kind of false information, and I only believed it when the full text appeared on the website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

So, when a delegation of EU ambassadors came to Zakarpattia just before the law was adopted, we, as leaders of the Hungarian community, appealed to both the Hungarian government and EU institutions to support Ukraine’s European integration and open negotiations. And when these amendments to the legislation were adopted by the parliament in December 2023, it came as a shock to me (in a positive way). I simply could not imagine that on 8 December, 317 MPs, representing all parliamentary factions, would support such specific and qualitative changes. We had not even dreamed of it all the years before.

At the very same time, I should note that the new legislation also has moments when there is a seemingly positive clause that can be interpreted differently on the ground.

This applies, for instance, to the part on the number of subjects taught in Ukrainian in classes with instruction in languages of national minorities. The list of subjects can be expanded upon the decision of the educational institution. Thus it raises questions about the automatic effect of the law, which would not allow individual communities to speculate.

I would like to emphasize right away that it is not that Hungarians do not want to learn Ukrainian or study in Ukrainian. There are many examples in Zakarpattia region where Hungarians themselves choose to study in Ukrainian, sometimes fully or where more than four subjects are taught in Ukrainian, as is currently provided for in the law.

However, there are communities where, for one reason or another, usually purely political, representatives of the Hungarian community may be denied the full range of language rights provided for by law. I emphasize: they may be denied not because of a lack of funds or teachers, but purely for political destructive reasons. Such actions provoke tension, even diplomatic disputes, although obviously, this is exactly what the local politicians who do this want.

Another example of speculation and conspiracy is the use of national symbols, in particular Hungarian ones, in Zakarpattia region. This also requires a clearly defined legal framework on how national minorities should unify, register and use their symbols, and what they may contain.

And when all these and other issues are clearly enshrined in law, we, as civilized people and ethnic communities, will be able to stand up for ourselves and our rights, regardless of who stands behind our backs. And if the European Union or elsewhere asks for our opinion on the state of protection of the rights and interests of national communities in Ukraine, we will be able to answer with even more confidence. I am convinced that this serves Ukraine’s interests.

🇺🇦 Ця публікація доступна також українською мовою: Угорці Закарпаття прагнуть бути амбасадорами України у ЄС

🇭🇺 Ez a kiadvány magyar nyelven is elérhető: A Kárpátaljai magyarok arra törekednek, hogy Ukrajnát képviseljék az EU-ban

🇸🇰 Text v slovenčine: Zakarpatskí Maďari sa chcú stať ambasadórmi Ukrajiny v EÚ

László Zubánics,
Chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Federation in Ukraine,
InfoPost.Media

* This text is the author’s column, which means it represents, first of all, the views of the author of the material, which may not coincide with the views of the InfoPost. We publish author’s columns, first and foremost, for the sake of discussion of important topics, since we believe in the power of public dialogue. Should you want to write an author’s column for us, email us at editor.infopost@gmail.com

** The publication was prepared within the framework of the Re:Open Ukraine project, implemented with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of International Renaissance Foundation.

Group 141

“Children from Hungarian-speaking villages come all the way to us to study in Ukrainian.” The story of an (un)common school in Zakarpattia

Every day, a school in the border village of Csepe (Ukrainian: Чепа, Chepa) does what Ukrainian and Hungarian politicians are incapable of doing or unwilling to do: it resolves the Ukrainian-Hungarian debate on the language of education in multiethnic environments in favor of children and the quality of their education.

The Ukrainian village of Csepe lies on the border of three states: it is located in Vynohradiv district, which is now part of Berehovo district in Zakarpattia region of Ukraine, and is almost equidistant, some 15 km, from the border with Hungary and Romania.

Csepe En

The village of less than 2,000 inhabitants is also unique in terms of its multiethnicity. According to the 2001 census, its population is ⅔ ethnic Hungarian and ⅓ ethnic Ukrainian. The village is located on the border of territories inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians on one side and ethnic Hungarians on the other.

Not surprisingly, the local school reflects this ethnic mosaic. The Csepe Secondary School of the Pyiterfolvo Village Council has classes in both Ukrainian and Hungarian.

It makes the experience of this school invaluable in terms of understanding education in multiethnic and multilingual communities, which is particularly important in the context of the numerous changes made to Ukrainian legislation relating to this issue during 2017-2023.

We spoke about all this with the headmaster of the Csepe school, Natalia Hryhoriak. We received sincere answers but, more importantly, professional and substantive explanations of what is and should be the basis of the Ukrainian-Hungarian dialogue on the language of education. And this is absolutely not what we usually hear from Ukrainian and Hungarian politicians or read in the news with flashy headlines.

Lmk 9475

“Some students from Hungarian-speaking villages come to our school just to study in Ukrainian classes.”

Tell us a little about the school you are a principal at.

Csepe Secondary School consists of two buildings. The main one is located in the village of Csepe, where students of grades 1-11 study. The other building is located in the village of Hetynia (2.2 km from Csepe), where four primary grades and two preschool groups study.

Currently, 356 students and 44 preschoolers are enrolled in our school. We provide educational services to children from nine villages, including Chepa (Csepe), Hetynia (Tiszahetény), Zatysivka (Csomafalva), Chornotysiv (Feketeardó), Sasovo (Tiszaszászfalu), Nevetlenfolu (Nevetlenfalu), Forholan (Forgolány), Pyiterfolvo (Tiszapéterfalva), and even Velyka Palad (Nagypalád).

There are 144 students who have traveled from other villages to attend our school this academic year.

Fortunately, we have our own bus, which partially solves the problem of transporting children. However, the state it’s in leaves much to be desired, as do the roads it travels on.

There are quite a few Hungarian-speaking villages among the ones listed. How many Hungarian-speaking classes are there in your school?

Twenty out of 26 classes are taught in Ukrainian, with the remaining six being taught in Hungarian. There are between eight and nine students on average in Hungarian-language classes.

Incidentally, some students from Hungarian-speaking villages travel to our school to study in Ukrainian classes.

Lmk 9497

The vast majority of teachers are bilingual

What is the reason for the popularity of the Csepe school among the residents of the surrounding villages? After all, there are local schools in all the settlements you mentioned.

It makes us really happy that so many parents trust us with the most precious thing — their children. This suggests that they are satisfied with the quality of educational services we provide.

There is another aspect: some parents choose our school because they want their child to improve their knowledge of Ukrainian or Hungarian.

Our school resembles a “linguistic laboratory” in a way, where, moving from one class to another, a student enters a different language environment.

This obviously contributes to the development of students’ language skills.

The priority of language learning differs depending on the family and, to some extent, the place the child comes from. For example, all students who come from Hetynia (over 90% ethnic Ukrainians) are willing to study in Ukrainian-language classes, while 80-90% of students from Chornotysiv (⅔ ethnic Ukrainians, ⅓ Hungarians according to the 2001 census) come to enhance their knowledge of Hungarian.

The situation with pupils from the village of Pyiterfolvo is interesting. According to the 2001 census, 96% of the village residents consider Hungarian to be their native language, so it is obvious that the educational process in Pyiterfolvo school is mainly conducted in this language. However, some students from this village choose our school because of Ukrainian language instruction.

And what about students from the village of Csepe itself?

There is a long-overdue need to conduct a new census in Ukraine. In 2001, almost 67% of the villagers said that their native language was Hungarian, and 33% said it was Ukrainian.

But I think the situation has slightly changed since then. A lot of families have moved abroad.

It seems to me that there has been a trend toward an increase in the Ukrainian-speaking population over the past few years.

Often, students whose parents speak Hungarian at home are enrolled in Ukrainian-language classes. This is because of parents’ worries about how their child will pass external independent testing in Ukrainian.

Parents often worry whether their children will be able to realize their goals in Ukraine, including whether they will be able to enter a university, get an education, find a job, etc.

As a school principal, I can clearly see that almost all parents, regardless of what language they speak at home, want their child to be able to speak Ukrainian.

Lmk 9509

There are probably students in the Ukrainian-language classes of the Csepe school who understand Hungarian better than Ukrainian. How do teachers deal with it?

The great majority of the teaching staff come from our native village, so they have been bilingual since childhood.

Teachers in primary school certainly struggle the most, because they have to teach basic competencies in the Ukrainian language.

Often, children who did not attend kindergarten or were brought up in a Hungarian-speaking environment, but their parents decided to send them to a Ukrainian class, come to our first grade.

The teachers of our school comply with educational legislation and conduct lessons in the state language. However, the child should be at the center of the educational process. If we see that a student does not understand something and cannot continue to master new material, then we explain something in Hungarian.

We have a very interesting example of a student from the village of Forholan, with almost all the population speaking Hungarian. As a principal, I was very worried, because at the time of his enrollment in the school, he had zero knowledge of Ukrainian. Now he is already a fifth-grade student and has significantly improved his Ukrainian language skills over the years. This is a great achievement of the primary school teachers. Unfortunately, due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this boy’s family moved to Hungary.

What is the psychological climate like at Csepe school? Does language become an obstacle to communication between students?

We try to maintain a very inclusive atmosphere. We try to do everything we can to make every student feel “one of our own” and loved.

Naturally, teachers explain what tolerance is during educational activities. But I think that our students understand it from childhood, because they are raised in a multiethnic and multilingual environment.

Language never becomes an obstacle in communication between children, because there are subjects taught in Ukrainian in Hungarian-speaking classes, as required by the Law on Complete General Secondary Education, and Ukrainian-speaking classes have Hungarian as a second foreign language (the first foreign language is English—ed.). Therefore, all the students of our school are bilingual to some extent.

On the transition to a new educational model

There are Hungarian-speaking classes in the structure of the Csepe school, where almost all subjects are taught in Hungarian. How did you, as a school principal, react to the adoption of the Law “On Complete General Secondary Education” in 2017, which provided for an increase in the share of subjects to be taught in the state language?

Editor’s note: Between 2017-2020, Ukraine adopted amendments to its educational legislation, according to which the following model was proposed for teaching in EU languages, including Hungarian: up to and including Grade 4, children can be taught exclusively in their native language, including; in Grade 5, 20% of the educational material should be taught in Ukrainian, with an annual increase to 40% in Grade 9, and in the final grades, this percentage of time taught in the state language should be up to 60%. In December 2023, Ukraine adopted further amendments to its legislation on the rights of national minorities, including education in the official languages of the EU. According to them, members of the Hungarian minority will be able to study all subjects in their native language even after Grade 4, with the exception of 4 subjects, namely Ukrainian language, Ukrainian literature, history of Ukraine and the Defense of Ukraine.

I realized how difficult it would be to switch to the state language of instruction overnight in classes that had been taught in Hungarian for years.

It is also obvious that the language environment has the greatest impact on the formation of language competences: if a child does not hear enough Ukrainian, they will never be able to speak it at a sufficient level. I think there is only one way out and it is to seek a compromise together.

We approved the list of subjects to be taught in Ukrainian in Hungarian-speaking classes from 2020 to 2023 at our school. We teach sciences with a lot of complex terminology in Hungarian, and humanities are taught in Ukrainian, as they are more conducive to the development of coherent speech in students.

In other words, we have been gradually approaching the language proportions stipulated by the 2020 legislation.

Some of the students who graduated from the 9th grade with Hungarian as the language of instruction during the 2021-2022 school year continued their studies in Hungarian schools, and some of them chose to join the Ukrainian-language 10th grade of our school. They went on to achieve good academic results.

In your opinion, were the proportions of Ukrainian language instruction (20-40-60% of the time spent teaching in Ukrainian from grade 5 introduced in 2020-2023 under the Law on Complete Secondary Education) feasible for representatives of national minorities?

This is a very delicate and individualized issue. Because even in subjects taught in Ukrainian in Hungarian-speaking classes, the teacher sometimes has to switch to Hungarian to help the child understand what is being said. In fact, this is how we use elements of bilingual education.

The good thing is that most of our teachers are bilingual. Of course, this takes extra time in the classroom, so sometimes the teacher has to find a “golden medium” between implementing the curriculum and explaining information to students in their native language.

Sometimes it can be quite difficult, especially given the overload of factual information in the curriculum. But our teachers are very creative and each of them looks for their own life hacks to achieve this goal.

Lmk 9457

Tell us in more detail about the transition to the 2020 legislation on language proportions. How did parents and students react to these changes?

Those changes made few parents happy, because they had enrolled their children in Hungarian-language classes in order to educate them in their native language.

We have to admit that some subjects that have been taught in the state language in Hungarian-language classes are more difficult for students than when the same subjects were taught in Hungarian. The child has to make extra efforts to understand what is being said in class.

But there is another side of the coin. A colleague of mine from a Hungarian-speaking village in Vynohradiv district recently told me how poor the students’ command of Ukrainian was. Of course, a situation like this shouldn’t take place either, because all Ukrainian citizens have to be integrated into society and feel comfortable being part of it.

I am delighted that none of the parents came to me with complaints that some subjects were taught in Ukrainian in Hungarian-language schools. They are well aware that the school must act in a legal manner and comply with the law.

It seems to me that the attitude of parents to these innovations strongly depends on how the head of the educational institution presents information about the changes. In our school, we have always explained to both parents and students that knowledge of the Ukrainian language increases chances of successful self-realization in the professional sphere and expands opportunities.

We have very interesting examples of graduates of our school’s Hungarian-language classes entering prestigious Ukrainian universities to study dentistry, applied mathematics, English and even Ukrainian philology, etc.

For me, this is proof that our arguments were heard.

Learning in a new way: how we responded to the changes of 2023

According to the legislative changes adopted in December 2023, representatives of the Hungarian minority will be able to study all subjects in their native language even after grade 4, with the exception of four subjects (Ukrainian language and literature, history of Ukraine and the Defense of Ukraine). How do you personally feel about these changes in legislation? Has Csepe School already started implementing them?

Until the end of the 2023-2024 school year, we are adhering to the decisions of the previous pedagogical councils and continue to teach several subjects (Ukrainian language and literature, computer science, fine arts and the subject “Health and Safety”) in Ukrainian.

In the next academic year, we will address this issue in a collegial way, taking into account the available human resources.

How did students, parents and teachers perceive the 2023 legislative changes?

We have not yet discussed this issue with parents. I think we will ask for their opinion at the next parental meeting, of course. But we will still make a decision based on all the important considerations.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to find staff amidst the full-scale invasion… Teachers move abroad, and not all of them intend to return, even if the war ends.

Therefore, the issue of teaching in a national minority language depends not only on us, parents, or the law, but also on who among the teachers remains to work in Ukraine.

Ez a cikk magyar nyelven is elérhető: “Gyerekek a magyar nyelvű falvakból utaznak be hozzánk, hogy ukrán nyelvet tanuljanak”. A Kárpátaljai (nem) átlagos iskola története

Ця публікація доступна також українською мовою: «Діти з угорськомовних сіл доїжджають до нас, щоб навчатися українською». Історія (не)звичайної школи на Закарпатті

Maksym Molnar
specially for Infopost.media
photo credit: Myhailo Lemak

* The publication was prepared within the framework of the Re:Open Ukraine project, implemented with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of International Renaissance Foundation.

Group 141

Natalia Hodvan on bilingual education: Initially, parents were afraid that we were turning a Hungarian school into a Ukrainian one, but…

It appears that even physics can be successfully taught in two languages, Ukrainian and Hungarian, at the same time. The experience of a teacher from Vynohradiv who decided to try this approach in her school proves it.

The Infopost editorial team presents another article on the specifics of the educational process in multiethnic environments. Simply put, it serves as an example of what should form the basis for a reasonable compromise between Ukraine and Hungary in the debate on the educational and other rights of the Hungarian national community, particularly in the context of Ukraine’s accession to the EU and Kyiv’s implementation of the latest innovations in educational legislation.

A Vynohradiv-based teacher, Natalia Hodvan has 12 years of work experience in both Hungarian and Ukrainian educational institutions. She is bilingual and comes from a Hungarian-Ukrainian family. She worked for six years as a physics teacher and deputy principal at Vynohradiv Secondary School No. 3 until 2021.

Together with Gabriella Gomoki, who appeared in another of our stories on the same topic, they tried to implement the principles of bilingual education in a Hungarian-language school. It was certainly not easy, but together with their colleagues, they gradually succeeded.

Photo 2021 07 28 16 35 37 (2)

Their experience is both an example and a precedent, which, unfortunately, are still being ignored in the Ukrainian-Hungarian debate over the educational rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. This is the reason why this article deserves special attention.
Read also: How an ethnic Hungarian became a Ukrainian philologist and managed to introduce bilingual studies into a Hungarian school.

An interview with Gabriella Gomoki

Natalia, how did you learn about bilingual education and when did you start implementing it in your classes?

I learnt about the methodology of bilingual teaching in 2018. But as it turned out, I intuitively used elements of bilingualism long before that. This was because not all the students at the school where I worked were native Hungarians, as well as Ukrainian was not everyone’s native language either.

So your students weren’t surprised when you started using bilingualism on a regular basis, were they?

No. I had used presentations in physics lessons in Ukrainian and commented on the slides in Hungarian or vice versa even before the bilingual education was implemented in our school. The physics course begins in the 7th grade, so at first students adapted to my teaching system for about six months gradually getting used to it.

Photo 2021 07 28 16 30 41

You say that sometimes you showed slides in Hungarian and commented on them in Ukrainian. I don’t see the reason for it, since Vynohradiv School No. 3 is an educational institution where all students seem to understand Hungarian.

It’s one thing to understand and speak a language, and another to understand physical processes, to delve into a topic in a particular language. I can cite my own experience as an example. I have never had any problems with the Ukrainian language because my mother is Ukrainian and I have been bilingual since childhood. I had graduated from this particular Hungarian-language school, where I worked until recently. But when I entered Uzhhorod National University, it was very difficult for me to study physics and some other specialized subjects in Ukrainian. I often did not understand what my teacher was saying because they used Ukrainian terminology that I did not know.

We also need to take into account the psychological constituent: if the language is not a native one for a person, then the explanation can be perceived very subjectively.

Just imagine: let’s say you know Slovak well. While it is not your native language, you think in Ukrainian. So if someone starts explaining a complex physical phenomenon in Slovak, you will perceive this explanation differently than you would in your native Ukrainian.

Of course, it’s a little bit incorrect to compare Slovak and Hungarian because they belong to different language groups, but I think the point is clear.

That’s why, even before the introduction of bilingual education in our school, I often switched to another language when students had additional questions.

Photo 2021 07 28 16 35 37

It’s just that I have always imagined Vynohradiv School No. 3 as an educational institution where everyone speaks Hungarian to the fullest extent.

There are students who know Hungarian well in some classes, but they still think in Ukrainian. Usually, these are children from multiethnic families. I surely could not ignore their requests for clarification. The situation is similar at the elementary level of our school. Often children come to the first grade with little understanding of Hungarian. It seems to me that the number of such students has increased recently.

I know that parents often send their children to Vynohradiv School No. 3 to improve their Hungarian language skills. Usually, this is how they prepare them for studying and living abroad.

It is a fact that some parents have this motivation. But they do not always understand the difference between learning a language and learning a specific subject in that language. Relatively speaking, if you create an environment for such students where all subjects are taught in Hungarian, it is obvious that they will learn this language in 11 or 12 years of school. But this does not mean that they will learn the subjects in this language.

The best option would probably be for all teachers at Vynohradiv school No. 3 to be bilingual.

It is difficult to find a teacher in our town who knows Hungarian well and can explain their subject in Hungarian. This is particularly so due to the low prestige of the teaching profession in the country. It is even harder to find a teacher who can explain a subject in two languages. I can teach physics bilingually only because I graduated from the Ukrainian university. My experience of working in Ukrainian-language schools also contributed to it. Teachers who work in minority schools today usually know their subject perfectly in only one language. At least in Zakarpattia, the situation is exactly like this.

I think it is very important where a teacher received their higher education.

Yes, it does. In my situation, it was the university that played a key role. For the first two years of my studies, I struggled studying in Ukrainian.

Natalia, I know that in 2018, together with your colleagues you took part in the project “Building Multilingualism of Children and Students: Progressive European Ideas in the Ukrainian Context”, where you completed a training course on bilingual education. Could you tell us what impact this project had on your work?

We saw the bilingual methodology as an opportunity to make it easier for students to adapt to the new requirements of the Law of Ukraine “On Complete General Secondary Education”.

Editor’s note: This conversation was recorded before Ukraine adopted the latest amendments to the legislation on minority rights, including the ones related to the education in the official languages of the EU. In particular, according to the latest amendments adopted in December 2023, members of the Hungarian minority will be able to study all subjects in their native language even after grade 4, with the exception of 4 subjects, namely Ukrainian language, Ukrainian literature, Ukrainian history and the Defense of Ukraine. Previously, the following was proposed as a model for teaching in EU languages: in grade 5, 20% of the educational material should be taught in Ukrainian, increasing annually to 40% in grade 9, and in the final grades, this percentage of time spent in the state language should be up to 60%.

It was important for us that a teacher could combine two languages when teaching a subject. We wanted to avoid a division where some subjects are taught entirely in Hungarian and others in Ukrainian.

Photo 2021 07 28 16 30 40

During the training, we learned much from the experience of our foreign partners. The event featured very interesting speakers from Austria (Tyrol region), Kyrgyzstan and other countries.

It was also fascinating to learn from colleagues who work in schools with students of as many as three nationalities in one class.

Did your students observe any differences in teaching methods after you completed the training?

They did. Because it helped me to implement a certain consistency in my teaching process. Before the training, I used a bilingual approach intuitively or when students asked me some clarifying questions.

In September 2019, I started implementing bilingualism in every physics lesson in grades 8 and 9. We were provided with a great deal of guidance and advice during the training. But I believe that the Ministry of Education should develop comprehensive methodological guidance for each subject in order to bring bilingual education to a high level, something similar to the recommendations of the New Ukrainian School program, since teaching physics in two languages, for instance, is very different from teaching biology.

The bilingual methodology is currently based mainly on the teacher’s creative approach and is not yet regulated. There is a great lack of thorough methodological elaborations of different types of lessons for each subject.

Have you noticed any changes in your students’ academic achievements since you introduced the bilingual methodology?

I wouldn’t say so. This approach is aimed at improving the students’ language skills. My task is not to check their language skills but their knowledge of physics.

How did parents react to the bilingualism of your lessons?

At first, they were afraid that the administration was turning the school into a Ukrainian-language one. All concerns ceased after we held a parental meeting and explained everything.

We managed to communicate to the parents the main advantage of bilingualism, that is an increase in the competitiveness of students after graduation.

Maksym Molnar, specially for Infopost.media
Photo: from the archive of Natalia Hodvan

Ez a cikk magyar nyelven is elérhető: Natália Hodván a kétnyelvű oktatásról: A szülők eleinte attól tartottak, hogy egy magyar iskolából ukránt csinálunk, de…

Ця публікація доступна також українською мовою: Наталія Годван про білінгвальну освіту: Батьки спершу боялися, що ми перетворюємо угорськомовну школу на українськомовну, але…

Group 141

Report: No one in Ukraine questions the EU and NATO accession, and this also creates risks

The key one risk in such a case is the over-inflated expectations of Ukrainian society, especially regarding timeline, conditions and impact of Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO in wartime.

Hence, derivative risks and even threats are the weak expectation management by Ukrainian elites and high motivation, and even temptation for them to exploit this topic in internal political fights.

So, it is worth to speak about the risk of kind of “balkanization” and “orbanization” of Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO in mid and long terms.

EU and NATO in Ukraine: On the top of the public agenda, strongly linked with security and war

Throughout 2023, the EU and NATO accession remained one of the leading topics in Ukraine’s media space, strongly interconnected to each other.

This is determined due to both narratives and timelines, and proved by the analysis of the 100 most engaged Facebook posts on the EU and NATO in 2023, which were selected within this study based on keyword matching in the Ukrainian (and partly Russian) language with help of the CrowdTangle tool.

the 100 most engaged Facebook posts on the EU and NATO in 2023

Timeline level. Given that in 2022 Ukraine applied for membership in both the EU and NATO, and even received candidate status from the EU, it is natural that Ukraine paid great attention and expectations to the key EU and NATO summits scheduled for 2023.

Thus, in the first half of 2023, the public discourse on foreign policy of Ukraine was dominated by the topic of NATO, especially before and after the Vilnius summit (July 11-12). While the second half of last year, especially in the run-up to the EU summit (December 14-15), was dominated by the topic of EU accession. In both cases, the public discourse in Ukraine was united by expectations of progress toward Ukraine’s membership in these alliances, including an official invitation to NATO and a decision to open negotiations on EU membership.

At the same time, it is important to note that throughout 2023 the EU and NATO topics do not compete with the key one of the public discourse in Ukraine, which is still the Russian invasion and its aspects (massive Russian shelling, Ukrainian counteroffensive, etc.), but is closely related to it and complements this key topic through the security dimension.

Another important detail, which is confirmed by the analysis of the aforementioned sample of the 100 most engaged posts on Facebook, is that Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO is not linked in the media discourse of Ukraine to the accession of Moldova, North Macedonia (in the case of the EU), or the Western Balkans in general. Of course, this interconnection exists in the expert community in Ukraine, especially in the context of the EU and at the level of the Ukraine-Moldova duo (before the Russian invasion, it was in the context of the “Associated Trio” narrative, i.e. Ukraine-Moldova-Georgia). However, neither Moldova nor any other country is present in the Ukrainian media discourse as a partner or competitor of Ukraine in its accession to the EU and NATO, and the European or Euro-Atlantic integration of these countries is not covered much in Ukraine.

Narrative level. The Russian war against Ukraine and Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO are linked now in public discourse by 3 key issues:

Western financial and military assistance,
sanctions against Russia and its allies (Iran, China),
legally binding commitments of the West to Ukraine’s sovereignty against Russian future aggression with relevant support in resources and forces,
post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.

Due to the facts that after the start of the Russian invasion the EU buys weapons for Ukraine (EPF, European Peace Facility), while NATO has limited itself to a coordinating role in providing military assistance, the typical perception of the EU as “just economic union” and NATO as “a key military one” have changed in Ukraine. In public discourse EU and NATO topics in Ukraine have been linked on issues such as security and Russian aggression, appearing at the spotlight of the narrative battle on “peace”, “victory”, “new world order”.

As of September – October 2023 59% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine’s membership in the EU is important for long-term security, and another 57% believed it was important for Ukraine’s economic prospects.

In fact, such a shift in perception of the EU and NATO topics has additional background. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, which began with the occupation of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine, was started by the Kremlin during the Revolution of Dignity (another title is “Euromaidan”) in Ukraine, which in turn began after the pro-Russian Yanukovych regime refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU and was held under the slogans of EU integration. At that time, NATO accession of Ukraine was out of the agenda, and Ukraine’s membership in alliance was a divisive issue: as of March 2014 43% of Ukrainians were against NATO accession, and 34% in favor. So, Russian aggression in Ukraine’s public discourse has been tied to the EU topic far before 2022, when Russia has launched the full-scale invasion exploiting the NATO topics as one of the pretexts.

Figures that matter and prove

All these changes in perceptions and narratives about the EU and NATO in Ukraine are clearly visible in the results of sociological surveys.

Let’s start with the megatrend: since 2014, which was even further reinforced in February 2022, the level of support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO has not only been growing, but has reached unprecedented levels of 80-90% support.

Iri Eu Nato Ukraine Rating Group Survey 1

Support of the EU accession: blue – for the accession, red – against. Source ratinggroup.ua

Iri Eu Nato Ukraine Rating Group Survey 2

Support of NATO accession: blue – for the accession, red – against. Source ratinggroup.ua

Moreover, public attitudes show that EU and NATO membership have synchronized in terms of indicators and trends, and these issues no longer divide Ukrainian society, but unite it.

Given this level of support for joining both the EU and NATO, it is not surprising that none of the 100 most engaged with Facebook posts in Ukrainian language about either the EU or NATO in 2023, which were selected for this study using the CrowdTangle tool, contained hostile connotations.

This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, none of the major domestic political actors in Ukraine dare to openly pursue anti-EU and anti-NATO rhetoric. The only exception is the controversial politician Oleksiy Arestovych, who, after leaving Ukraine, began spreading anti-Western and pro-Russian narratives. By the way, the level of trust in Oleksiy Arestovych has dropped almost 6 times over the year – from 62% in May 2022 to 11% in December 2023.

On the other hand, the penetration and influence of Russian disinformation from the outside is negligible due to the peculiarities of the Ukrainian media space after the Russian invasion, as described in detail in a separate report by IRI.

Two more important beacons based on the results of the most recent social surveys, which confirm that in the perception of Ukrainians of the EU and NATO there is a clear relationship between joining these alliances and understanding the essence of the war against Russia and winning this war:

- as of December 2023 42% of Ukrainians named Ukraine’s accession to NATO for guaranteed protection from another war as one of the key achievements of this war with Russia.

This is the second result next to the punishment of all Russian war criminals (42%) and compensation for all damages caused to the economy and citizens (41.5%). The release of all prisoners and the return of deported Ukrainians are in the first place: 69% of Ukrainians called this point as the main achievement in the current war with Russia.

- as of June 2023 the same number of Ukrainians – 14% each – consider it acceptable to give up on joining either the EU or NATO in exchange for an end to Russia’s aggression. This idea is considered unacceptable by 72.8% (EU) and 71.7% (NATO), respectively.

The same trend was confirmed in December 2023: 56.9% of Ukrainians consider it unacceptable to give up joining NATO as a concession in possible negotiations with Russia, and 61% consider it unacceptable to give up joining the EU.

So, the EU and NATO accession for Ukraine now are not just pure geopolitics, choice between Russia and the West, economic benefits, etc, but the core of the existential war for independence, survival of an ethnic and political nation, and decolonization from Russia. This brings us to the kind of grand narrative that Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign and democratic state depends on its accession to both the EU and NATO.

Over-inflated expectations

The situation described above in the Ukrainian media space and public opinion regarding the perception of accession to the EU and NATO could be called ideal, or at least certain.

However, the problem of Ukrainians’ expectations in this context is obvious. These expectations are incredibly high now, both in terms of joining the EU and NATO, and in terms of ending the war.

As of December 2022 (a year before the decision to open negotiations), 30.8% of Ukrainians believed that Ukraine would join the EU in the next 1-2 years; another 24.4% – in the next 4-5 years; 26.9% – as soon as the war ended.

Iri Eu Nato Ukraine Infosapience Survey 1.jpg

As of December 2023 19.2% of Ukrainians expect Ukraine to join NATO in full at the Washington Summit; a total of 46.3% expect Ukraine to be invited to join NATO, either with or without the accession process.

Iri Eu Nato Ukraine Infosapience Survey 2

At the same time, as of December 2023 more than half of Ukrainians (58%) believe that Ukraine will win this war in the short term: 6% – in the next few months, 21% – by the summer of 2024, and another 31% – in 1-2 years. In the medium term (3-5 years), 15% of respondents are inclined to win. At the same time, supporters of the most pessimistic scenario, who do not believe that victory will come in their lifetime, are in the absolute minority (2.5%).

Traps

The time trap. It is obvious that Ukraine will not be able to join the EU and NATO in the short term, i.e., in the next 1-2 years. Even in the medium term – 4-5 years – it looks problematic.

The 2030 date announced by European Council President Charles Michel as the year of the new enlargement barely fits the expectations of 24.4% of Ukrainians, although it looks like the most optimistic date from the point of view of the forecast.

In addition, it is important to understand that the threat of additional and stronger disillusionment also lies in the expectation of a quick victory in the war and the strong link in Ukrainian perception between joining the EU and NATO and the war against Russia. A long-term war with Russia is likely to serve as an additional factor for disillusionment with the EU and NATO. Especially taking into consideration that both alliances have already publicly and explicitly stated that it is impossible for Ukraine to join the EU and NATO fully until the war ends.

This narrative connection and the inflated expectations of Ukrainians regarding the EU, NATO, and victory in the war are ideal grounds for various conspiracies, such as “the West does not want Ukraine to join the EU or NATO, so it helps just enough to ensure that Ukraine does not lose the war, but also does not win it.”

The trap of discourse, legitimacy, and policy quality. The unprecedentedly high level of support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO, as well as the absence of critics of this course, creates the illusion that there is nothing to discuss and educate about the EU and NATO and that such a discussion is not necessary, and that diplomats and bureaucrats will do the rest of the work. Especially now that accession talks with Ukraine have been opened.

The absence of such a discussion not only creates an additional risk as to how well and inclusively Ukraine will implement the reforms necessary for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

In this regard, two cases from 2023 are illustrative: the adoption of two so-called European integration laws. The first is about the financial monitoring of politically exposed persons (PEPs), and the second is about changing the legislation on ensuring the rights of national minorities. In both cases, the government’s key argument for adopting the draft laws in their current form was that they were necessary to open negotiations on EU accession.

This approach provoked public criticism, which can be summarized as follows: Ukraine is making unnecessary and destructive concessions, saying that the PEP law could almost destroy the Ukrainian civil service, and the new law on minority rights could undo all previous achievements in terms of de-Russification, protection of the Ukrainian language and nation-building.

In the end, in the case of changes to the legislation on the rights of national minorities, the draft law was finalized, submitted to the parliament with changes from virtually all factions, and voted for by 317 votes. Although it was actually about changes to the legislation that Hungary has been demanding for the past 5-6 years and using as an excuse to block integration into the EU and NATO, as well as pro-Russian rhetoric about the oppression of minorities in Ukraine.

Recommendations

Given these public sentiments and the media discourse in Ukraine on EU and NATO topics, it is important for Ukrainian decision makers and their Western partners to do the following:

1. Initiate and conduct additional qualitative research on how public opinion and public discourse on EU and NATO accession in Ukraine is shaped, in particular, focusing on:

- studying such media platforms as Telegram and Tik-Tok, given the potential influence and depth of penetration of Russian, pro-Russian or other malign disinformation on the EU and NATO topic;
- the impact of publications of the leading Western media on shaping narratives and agendas in the Ukrainian media space. Such a need is justified by the trend that the number of skeptical materials about the war and Western support, Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO, etc. is growing in these media outlets;
- identification of the non-obvious interdependencies in the level of public perception and narratives between the topic of Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO and other critical topics in Ukraine, such as war, mobilization, peace negotiations, security guarantees, etc.;
- studying the moods of certain target audiences in Ukraine, such as farmers, government officials, etc., to explore the protest potential of sensitive target audiences. A good example in this regard is Poland, where there is one of the highest overall support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU in Europe, while farmers and truck drivers are turning into a key protest force on this issue;
- identify narratives and conspiracy theories popular among Ukrainians, whether of Russian or any other origin, that question the feasibility of Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO, and then develop strategies and tactics to counter these influences. As an example of such a narrative and conspiracy theorizing: “Joining the EU will destroy Ukrainian agribusiness”.

This will allow for a deeper understanding of the topic, which at first glance looks unambiguously positive and problem-free in terms of public support and approval.

2. To plan and deliver a series of strategic communications campaigns that would balance the over-inflated expectations of Ukrainians in several aspects:

- on the timeline of Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO;
- on the format of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. In particular, to clarify in the public discourse as much as possible that it is not so much about negotiations as about Ukraine’s adaptation to all possible “club rules” and the need for point concessions as a fair price for the country’s overall success in the EU and NATO.

This communication should be aimed at changing the discourse from expectations and their feeding to a discourse of collaboration and inclusion.

Given the sensitivity of the issue for politicians, this task implies the greatest possible involvement of the expert community and opinion leaders with high recognition and credibility to deliver “bad news” and “hard truth.”

Former Western politicians and influencers who support Ukraine, such as former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, former Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, and former Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite, could play this role, historian Timothy Snyder, former European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, intellectual Anne Applebaum, former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, former Romanian President Traian Basescu, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and former top-level officials of the alliance.

3. By strategic communications and with the help of civil society, strengthen the public dialogue in Ukraine about the EU and NATO in the context of studying these alliances, the logic and specifics of their functioning, the specifics of accession, short-term difficulties and long-term benefits for Ukraine, etc. Such a dialogue should compensate for the actual absence of debates on joining the EU and NATO by focusing attention on education, experience, personal and social adaptation, etc.

It is important that these discussions are not only aimed at the general public, but are tailored to the specific target groups and sectors that will be in the focus of the negotiation process. We are talking about specific industries and sectors, such as agriculture, transport and logistics, IT, forestry, construction, light industry, local government, etc.

This is important for the prevention and moderation of conflict situations, for the development of more inclusive solutions through the involvement of additional specialized expertise, and for the formation of new sectoral coalitions that would advocate for EU and NATO membership based on pragmatic arguments.

At the same time, joining the EU and NATO should not be the only argument for the Ukrainian government or its Western partners to make certain decisions, especially unpopular reforms that will be required in the negotiation process.

4. Use the 2024 European Parliament election campaign as an occasion for an advocacy campaign in Ukraine and the EU in the style of “Ukraine in the EU: Stronger together”, “Peace is… Ukraine in the EU”, “EU needs you, EU needs Ukraine”.

Creative idea: create a simulation of the European Parliament elections in Ukraine, where individual opinion leaders offer their programs, explain and advocate for the EU.

Key components of the campaign: – countering disinformation narratives that may cast doubt on Ukraine’s accession to the EU; – balancing anti-Ukrainian and Eurosceptic rhetoric; – integrating Ukraine into the EU’s agenda as a future member; mobilizing Euro-optimist voters; – educating Ukraine about EU internal policies; – building critical and constructive perceptions of the EU’s “internal kitchen” in Ukraine; – developing a Ukrainian vision of EU reform before Ukraine’s accession;

Use the NATO Summit in Washington in a similar way, balancing the high expectations of Ukrainians regarding accession and invitation with a quality discussion on future membership, security guarantees, cooperation with the Alliance, etc.

5. Elaborate narratives to ensure that support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO does not depend on the duration of the war against Russia, the accession negotiation process, and internal reforms in the EU and NATO.

The updated narratives should explain and rationalize the fact that Ukraine has no alternative to joining the EU and NATO.

One possible new narrative is to explain EU and NATO accession as part of Ukraine’s existential question: Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign and democratic state depends on its accession to both the EU and NATO.

This report has been prepared with support from IRI’s Beacon Project. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of IRI.

Dmytro Tuzhanskyi
director of the Institute for Central European Strategy

InfoPost.Media

“Whenever are you going to take the body? You have had two check-ups confirmed already”. The story of Ihor, a defender from AzovStal

My name is Ksenia. My brother Ihor died in the terrible act of violence in the Volnovakha prison camp No120 in the village of Olenivka in Donetsk region.

Our whole family has always lived in the city of Melitopol, now temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation troops. It is the city Ihor loved for all of his life. He shared this love with our house, once built by our grandfather, so badly in need of repair. It used to be my brother’s dream – to get the house into shape. He never wished for war, moreover, I would say they were two incompatibles, Ihor and war. Yet, he loved his city and his motherland, so when the time came for him to make a choice, after finishing his compulsory military service, he chose to continue his service in the Azov regiment.

***

Instagram Post 4

Azov as a family

On January 18, 2022, after the New Year’s holiday festivities, my brother left for the city of Urzuf for training, actually starting his service in Azov.

Ihor was really excited with the attitude from his senior sworn brothers, as they welcomed him and the other newcomers, like brothers, in their fellowship so compassionately. The senior Azovians talked with the newly arrived, explaining them everything and being like true elder brothers. I know for sure that he really respected his officers, and I had never heard anything wrong from him concerning commanders and sworn brothers-in-arms at all.

Instagram Post 5

On that terrible morning, February 24, 2022, we could not get in touch with my brother. We could only guess then that he was located in the city of Mariupol, as the violent fight for the city had already begun. Later on, he made a call, though never telling much of what was then going on in the city, and what conditions his comrades-in-arms and himself were in. He never complained about the shortage of food and water and the impossibility to treat all the wounded ones. All the nightmares that were then happening at the AzovStal – we all got to know them from the news.

Instead, Ihor was really worried about our parents and his younger brother, staying in the city of Melitopol, already occupied, always asking if they had anything to eat. As he was talking to our parents, he would keep on encouraging them every time. And with, he was more sincere, saying that with his every flight to AzovStal he never knew if he would ever exit. Still, he believed that there would be a blockade lifting, and our soldiers would help them go out of the factory. Or that there would be an agreement for them to leave the site, saving their lives. Ihor was really determined not to exit to become a captive, saying he would rather blow himself up with a grenade than surrender to Ruscists.

Instagram Post 6

Release into captivity

On May 16, 2022 we saw Redis’ appeal (lieutenant colonel of the Azov regiment) and we realized that the garrison of Mariupol was leaving the AzovStal facility, exiting as prisoners of war to the RF. We were not quite sure then if Ihor had left with everybody else, as he had not phoned us, neither before their going out from the AzovStal or during the event. We had had a talk on April 21. Our family watched all the videos published by the Russians for the public access, without noticing him in any of those.

On the day when the recovery to captivity started, we were waiting intensely for the evening speech by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskiy. As he was delivering his speech, he stressed on the fact that it was precisely a case of recovery to captivity, and the boys were exiting from the factory under warranties given by international organizations, namely the UNO and IRC. That gave us a hope to meet our dear Ihor soon.

Morning of July 29, 2022

I remember the morning on July 29, 2022 – it was a morning I will never be able to forget. The act of violence that happened in the village of Olenivka, it was something that could not be imagined before it really happened. Yes, I did realize that life was not a bed of roses for our captive boys, true; but to be murdered in such a villainous and terrible way, unarmed and sleeping…it was the height of cynicism. And now I understand that those photos and videos we watched on the morning of July 29, I will envision them for all my life.

I just could not believe in what had happened. My family and I, we were shocked and frozen. At that time we did not know for sure if Ihor was staying in that “Barrack 200” and what struggle for justice was awaiting for us.

On July 30, 2022, early in the morning I saw lists of the dead and wounded in the act of violence in Olenivka, as compiled by Rascists, already available in all Telegram publics. And I saw my brother’s name in there. I just cannot describe the emotions I felt at that moment. I had both panic and no clear vision what was to be done next, whom to contact. We addressed everywhere – the coordination headquarters, the military unit, the Azov executive support service, the Red Cross, the National Information Bureau and to other authorities. We were told everywhere to wait for more accurate information, and we would be informed. They told us not to trust the dishonest Ruscists’ lists. At that time, I could not even imagine how long we would have to wait for the DNA results just to learn if Ihor is alive or not.

All the time since then we lived in hope. Hoping that Ihor is alive. Hoping that our country will carry out a rightful investigation involving international experts. Hoping we would not get forgotten. That the act of violence will be recognized as such internationally.

Life in chat

On October 10, 2022 the bodies were returned from Olenivka. All the relatives of the probable fatal casualties were united by the Azov executive support service into a separate chat. As we were informed, our country officials do not act based on the lists of casualties from the RF; instead, the military unit compiled their own one, based on evidence from those returning from captivity. Based on this principle we were added to the chat.

We waited for a couple of months for the results of the DNA expertise in silence. We were explained that it was not going to be a fast process, as Ukraine involves international experts for analyzing the corpses returned from Olenivka.

As António Guterres dismissed the mission on investigating the murder of Ukrainian captives in Olenivka, back on January 5, 2023, we realized that we had to unite among the families of the affected in the act of violence and support the investigation by ourselves.

Throughout the time our community has existed, we have managed to achieve some public disclosure, and our activity is giving some results. Early in April, a delegation from our community visited the offices of the UNO and IRC in Geneva. What I was really astonished with was that Ukraine did not actually invite any international from the UNO and the Red Cross for investigating the bodies returned after the act of violence in Olenivka. All this time we had been silent, being sure that our state had been doing all they could do to investigate the tragedy in a proper way, and then it turned out that nobody but relatives was interested indeed.

We still have a lot of things to do: to attain returning of the military captives wounded in the act of violence, to attain for the act to be officially acknowledged as such and – for Olenivka not to be forgotten by those to have given the order to exit to captivity under warranties. I insist on fair investigation of this tragedy.

Our expectations for Ihor to be alive after the act of violence never came true. We had been waiting for the DNA results for a very long time, with my mom phoning to the case officer and the Azov executive support service, at least twice a week – and we had no confirmation with the expertise results. And then, on May 23, 2023 (which was more than half a year after the bodies were returned), my mom got a call from the executive support service, and it was this: “When are you going to receive the body for funeral? You have had two DNA confirmations already.”

***

Defenders of Mariupol are true warriors, desperately committed to defending the city of Mariupol in total entrapment for 86 days. Ever since the first day of the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation, Mariupol’s defenders proved to the whole world their incredible courage, will power and their fighting spirit for freedom. Due to the city defense, Ukraine was able to receive arms from the partner countries, regroup troops in other direction and consequently regain the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia. They fought the enemy’s overwhelming forces, having not enough ammunition, food, water and sleep. During the period from May 16 to May 20, Mariupol’s defenders laid down their weapon at the AzovStal plant and exited to captivity by the order from the senior Ukraine’s authorities.

Defenders of Mariupol. Stories of the Invincible Ones – is a common project by Infopost.media a and Olenivka Families Community, a community uniting the captives’ families, the injured and killed during the act of terror in Olenivka on the night of July 28 to 29^th, 2022.

“Olenivka Families Community” was launched in January 2023, after the UNO General Secretary dismissed the mission on investigating murder occurrences among captives of war in Olenivka. The community enrolls over 100 people. A delegation from the Olenivka Families have already visited Geneva, meeting representatives from the UNO and International Red Cross at their headquarters.

Currently we would like to receive more communication with foreign journalists, performing live for audiences abroad, since the subject of the act of terror in Olenivka is only known a little abroad. We are eager to share our witness with journalistic investigations, human rights advocacies and to have cooperation with OSINT-communities. We want to call to account the guilty ones in the international field.

Find us in the social media:
https://linktr.ee/olenivkafamilies

🇺🇦 Ця публікація доступна також українською мовою: “Коли будете забирати тіло? У вас було два збіги”. Історія Ігора, захисника з Азовсталі

🇭🇺 Ez a kiadvány magyar nyelven is elérhető: “Mikor fogják elvinni a holttestet? Két DNS egybeesés volt.” Igor, az Azovstal védőjének története

🇸🇰 Text v slovenčine: „Kedy si zoberiete telo? Mali ste už dve zhody.“ Príbeh Igora – obrancu z Azovstale

Infopost.Media

Defenders of Mariupol City. Stories by the invincible ones: a Sensei with his unfailing love for tanks

My name is Tetiana, and I am a daughter to Vladyslav Shelomiyenko. He was a Soviet officer’s son but a true Ukrainian body and soul.

Back in 1980 he came to live in Kharkiv but found his love. And I’m not talking of his wife and children. Here is his story.

***

Photo 2023 06 15 11 45 05

Vladyslav loved tanks more than everything else! It was then that he got settled as a tank operator and a crash tester. He knew everything about these vehicles.

And then he got fired because of a slippage. He got employed as a long-haul trucker but still longed with his heart and soul to come back to tanks. He even used to have a complete collection of models at home – it used to be a fashion then, those plastic models like do-it-yourself, assembling and gluing.

In 2014, Vladyslav decided it was time to stay at home for some time, so he resigned from his long-haul trucker’s position and started to work as a serviceman at a repair shop in Kharkiv city.

Late in the year, there was an explosion at his station, and, as he was saving cars from the fire, he got burned a lot. I still can remember the doctor’s words:

«Your father really had a bad luck, he needs a skin transplantation; and then, his left arm, one of the nerves is damaged so he won’t be able to work with it. The rehabilitation is going to take a long time».

But you should have known Vlad’s character better – in two-week time he was discharged from the hospital, and all the doctors came to shake hands with him. They could not believe that this man, only with his moral courage and self-efficacy was able to rise from the bed. By the way, he did not go for an operation ever since.

The way: from disability to volunteering

Yet, due to his burns and his arm that would not get healed properly, he was constantly advised to get registered as a disabled person and receive the invalidity status.

Every time he heard the advice, he got really angry: «I am not a disabled one, I will prove what I can do».

And so it happened that Vladyslav made up his mind to go to war, to protect his motherland. But the recruiting station officers would not accept him on health grounds. However, he would not give in and went in the direction of Donetsk city. He joined volunteers and started helping them.

Once it happened so that in a battle a tank got broken with our soldiers, and they could have got into trouble. Vlad happened to be there at that time, as a volunteer. He did not think a minute to rush to the combat vehicle, and in a few minutes the tank was able to escape to a safe place self-propelled.

Vladyslav becomes Sensei

The soldiers he helped out then appeared to be warriors from the Azov regiment. That’s how Vladyslav’s dream came true, and he returned to his love – to the combat vehicles he had had in his dreams all his life.

Then he got to the town of Urzuf, serving in a maintenance troop. It was then that he became his name – Sensei – for many of his comrades.

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He could surprise anybody with his ingenuity. There used to be two tanks at their station: one could travel but could not shoot, and the other one could shoot but could not travel. They were going to decommission them both, as they were not subject to repair. Not for Sensei. Vladyslav coupled one of the tanks to the other, so that the one still on the go dragged the one that could shoot. A luck collaboration case it appeared.

There were many things he could do one cannot imagine.

And then the war broke out. City of Mariupol. Captivity for the sake of lives. The colony of Olenivka. The act of terror.

And, Shelomiyenko Vladyslav, the Sensei, is found on the list of the dead under No 23. One cannot believe that yet. Fire took him away in the end. But it did not take our memories of him.

You are our true Hero. We do remember you. We always will.

Photo 2023 06 15 11 45 09

***

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🇺🇦 Ця публікація доступна також українською мовою: Захисники Маріуполя. Історії нескорених: «Сенсей» із безмежною любов’ю до танків

🇭🇺 Ez a kiadvány magyar nyelven is elérhető: Mariupol védői. A Rendíthetetlenek történetei: «Szenszej» a tankok iránti határtalan szeretetével

🇸🇰 Text v slovenčine: Obrancovia Mariupola. Príbehy nezdolných: «Sensei» s bezhraničnou láskou k tankom

Infopost.Media

Defenders of Mariupol city. Stories by the invincible ones: Getting married remotely, captivity and the unknown

I am Maria.

I am the wife to one of the invincible ones.

And, I am the one who still believes that Serhiy Alekseyevich, one of the Azov regiment soldiers, one of Mariupol defenders, a friendly and not an indifferent person, will come back to Ukraine. He has always fought for justice and has always realized that we have to fight in every possible way for a quiet future without wars.

Before Russia broke out its full-scale invasion, we had been living together for 4 years. We became a married couple only when Serhiy was already in Mariupol, on April 27, 2022. A week before we got married, he told me he wanted to marry me remotely, if I agreed to that. Surely, I did agree, since we had been planning to do it before that. This event greatly encouraged me then, giving me strength, hope and believe in his comeback from Mariupol to the happy and strong family of ours. And well, it gave him, I believe, the power to fight and believe that everything would be alright anyway.

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Casualty and capture

During the urban warfare in Mariupol, Serhiy was not writing to me anything of the situation in the city, only asking me ordinary questions of my job and well-being. He also asked me to hold on and hope for the best. I waited for a reply from Serhiy every single day, trying to support him as much as it was then possible.

Serhiy did not even tell me of his wounding that he got during the city fighting in Mariupol. I learnt about it only when he was taken captive, from his military unit. He was wounded again due to the terror attack in Olenivka. In spite of his wounds, he is still kept captive, although Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War clearly states that wounded soldiers are to be returned to their native country unconditionally and in any numbers. Besides, I was reassured in the Coordination Headquarters on treatment of prisoners of war at the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, that wounded are at priority for exchange. Yet, fighting for his life and freedom is ongoing.

On May 16, I read the news of the first soldiers exiting from the AzovStal plant. I could not believe it for a long time, if it was really true. I thought it was really evacuation, as the Ukrainian authorities were explaining on that evening.

Wait a bit. We are working on it

I didn’t know then if Serhiy was among those soldiers exiting from the AzovStal, for he had written to me on May 13, saying nothing of his possible being taken captive. Only briefly saying: “Don’t worry if I am out of reach for a long time”.

And already on May 19, I was watching Russian video clips featuring our upstanders coming out from the AzovStal plant and then I saw my beloved one. It was a video from Colony #120 in the settlement of Olenivka.

In that video, there were also some representatives of the International Red Cross but, as it was known later, they did not speak to the captives and they only checked the imprisonment conditions very shortly and left.

I addressed all the stately bodies for a few times regarding my husband. Those were submissions to the National Informational Bureau, Coordination Headquarters on treatment of prisoners of war, National Police, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine. I also addressed the International Red Cross and the UNO task group. Their replies were always the same: “Wait a bit, we’re working on the issue”. He was not confirmed by the ICRC and Russia for almost 16 months in captivity. As the Red Cross representatives state, they did not attend the meeting when our first soldiers exited from the AzovStal plant.

The Terrorist Outrage

On the night of July 29, 2022 Russians conducted a cynical and violent terroristic act in Colony No 120 of the temporarily occupied Olenivka, where the last defenders of Mariupol city had been kept. Russians did a targeted mass assassination and mutilating of the prisoners of war. As a result of their terrorist act, over 50 militaries were murdered and over 100 got wounded.

Still we, relatives of Ukraine’s defenders, injured due to the act of terror, do not know exactly the names of those sleeping in the barracks on that night, number of people killed and the number of wounded. We have been trying to pick up the information with our own efforts. Nothing is known of many people’s destiny after the act of terror. Russia did not submit any lists of injured and all present in the barracks to our state bodies. And Ukrainian stately bodies cannot gather this information by themselves.

My husband was injured due to the act of terror – and this is proved by the lists of injuries as of July 30, 2022, as published by the Ministry of Defense of Russia. And in a few days I saw videos featuring my husband after the act of terror. He was then in hospital, and Russian propaganda journalist were asking him what had happened or what he had then heard. Serhiy was telling them of some two explosions: he did not pay attention to the first one and then everything was burning after the second one, and the captives started to get out from the burning barracks into the open air. Besides, a close friend of my husband’s, set free from the imprisonment later, also mentioned Serhiy’s wounding, saying that his both legs were hurt. By the latest records, he was taken to a Russian colony but yet I don’t know where he is.

And the situation with the wounded is really critical. Various representatives from the authorities are telling us that there are other wounded kept captive, having serious wounds than those exploded in Olenivka. But how can they have such detailed information on the nature of the wounds due to the act of terror, when there are even no complete records of all the people located there at that time?

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We have to be aware of the danger yet threatening them. We have to do our best to return from the imprisonment our people as soon as possible. That was a carefully planned act of terror, which is further proved with the following data we found in the open sources: 193 prisoners of war on July 27, 2022 were taken to the airshed located in the industrial area of the Colony, away from other barracks where prisoners of war were kept. They hurriedly refurbished it into a living barrack, providing beds.

At about 11 to 11-30 pm the act of terror was performed. The prisoners heard a few explosions, and everything started burning after the last one. The wounded were not allowed to get medication, neither the colony supervisors provided it themselves, due to which yet more people died, waiting in vain for medical support. They had to wait about 5 hours to be taken to hospital.

The wounded ones were transported in overcrowded lorries along bumpy rough roads, which brought yet more suffer them. The prisoners with light wounds were put into the so-called disciplinary cells for a month. They were actually isolated from communicating with other prisoners within the colony. Among the wounded, there were some who had it as a second or even a third injury. Then there were others wounded yet during the defense of Mariupol. So they have been staying imprisoned as casualties for over a year with no medical support.

Letters with no reply

Russia violates all standards of the international humanitarian legislation. According to the regulations of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, prisoners have a right to send and receive letters. Alas, it is not so. I wrote a letter to my husband in January this year but I am sure he did not get it. And I know of not a single case when relatives of Azov regiment prisoners got any reply.

Besides, militaries being kept captives must be confirmed. Yet, Russia does not confirm all of them. Another violation from them is keeping captives rather closed to the area where operations are conducted. Murders throughout the imprisonment, disabling, loss of weight, psychological and physical torturing – these are all violations.

And even after the execution in Olenivka, Russia did not receive any punishment. The international reaction was not sufficient, and on January 5, 2023 the mission from the UNO on investigating murder occurrences among captives of war was deactivated due to the impossibility to reach the scene of crime and absence of safety warranties. And Russia is continuing to torture people in captivity.

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***

Find us in the social media:
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🇺🇦 Ця публікація доступна також українською мовою: Захисники Маріуполя. Історії нескорених: Одруження на відстані, полон та невідомість

🇭🇺 Ez a kiadvány magyar nyelven is elérhető: Mariupol védői. A Rendíthetetlenek történetei: Házasságkötés távolságon, fogság és az ismeretlen

🇸🇰 Text v slovenčine: Obrancovia Mariupola. Príbehy nezdolných: Sobáš na diaľku, zajatie a neistota

Infopost.Media

Ukraine in defense: 10 features of the mediaspace of the country at war

The Russian invasion and the state of war per se, especially the way it is covered by the Ukrainian media and is perceived by Ukrainian society, had changed dramatically the Ukrainian media space for the last year. This impact is likely to have long-term consequences for the development of Ukraine’s media space, regardless of when the war ultimately comes to an end. This report aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the impact of the first year of the Russian full-scale invasion on Ukraine’s media space by examining 10 key features that have emerged

10 Features of Ukrainian Mediaspace:

Rapid and total “Ukrainization” of the public information space and displacement of the Russian language from it.
The level of influence and penetration of pro-Russian and Russian media in the Ukrainian media space has definitely been sharply decreasing in the last 2 years.
The Telegram turned into a key platform for spreading pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western messages and narratives.
Partial de-oligarchization of the Ukrainian information space.
Legitimately increased attention, reach and interaction on pages in social networks (primarily Facebook) of official state institutions.
There is an obvious increase in the audience and interaction on Facebook pages that have a geographical connection to the western part of Ukraine.
Western media outlets became agenda and narrative setters, as well as the key donor of quality content.
Personal media brands began often to replace and compete with mass media outlets.
Ukraine-West relations is one of the main topics with high potential of hostility.
Weak and lack of stratcom and state media interventions to prevent misinformation and conspiracy.

This hostile narrative research is conducted by the Institute for Central European Strategy (author Dmytro Tuzhanskyi) with the support of the International Republican Institute’s Beacon Project. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of IRI.

Following the full-scale invasion of February 24th, 2022, Ukraine’s media space became an active battlefield contested by both sides. This has resulted in the presence of many typical characteristics associated with a country at war. Some of the key characteristics that have emerged include centralization, propaganda, prevalence of patriotic and nationalist rhetoric, as well as self-censorship and other practices to ensure operational security of the armed forces.

It’s worth noting the significant role that the media has played in shaping the mood and expectations of Ukrainian society. The media has contributed to the pendulum-swinging phenomenon, whereby there are dramatic shifts in public sentiment from mass triumph to deep disappointment. The combination of media and modern technologies has transformed the Russian invasion into a “war on-air,”, when everyone everywhere can follow the biggest war in Europe since the Second World War live, like watching a TV or Netflix series. However, Ukrainians cannot simply change the channel and instead live all day every day.

Some of such features are imperceptible at first glance, and it was possible to map them out through to the methodology of the IRI’s Beacon Project study and based on analysis of the 1,588,540 pieces of online content, collected based on keyword matching of monitored media in the Ukrainian language to indicate those which potentially contain hostility regarding Western support for Ukraine and its ability to resist Russian aggression.

We invite you to read the full IRI’s report

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Feature #1. Rapid and total “Ukrainization” of the public information space and displacement of the Russian language from it.

The shift towards a Ukrainian-language dominant media space is not solely a result of the new language legislation in Ukraine, which was established between 2014-2019. Rather, it is largely due to the public’s reaction to the Russian invasion, with many associating the Russian language with Russia itself.

Although many Ukrainian media outlets still maintain Russian-language versions of their websites, the default starting page is almost always the Ukrainian-language version, and the vast majority of official communication in social networks is also conducted in Ukrainian, which, by the way, is a requirement of Ukrainian language legislation (came into effect on January 16 and July 16 2022 for print and online media including social media). Hence, during the year of the Russian invasion, the Ukrainian language established itself as the #1 language for public communication in Ukraine. The dominance of the Russian language in the information space of Ukraine and the clear division of the media by language, as well as the binding of the media’s language to the geopolitical orientation of media (if media is Russian-language it means it is most likely pro-Russian) are a thing of the past.

Feature #2. The level of influence and penetration of pro-Russian and Russian media in the Ukrainian media space has definitely been sharply decreasing in the last 2 years.

The key event in this regard is that a year before the start of full-scale Russian aggression in Ukraine, from February 2021, the NewsOne, ZIK and “112” TV channels were blocked (including on social networks). These channels were under the control of Viktor Medvedchuk – an indirect relative of Vladimir Putin and his main agent of influence in Ukraine. They were the main springboard and infrastructure for spreading pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives inside Ukraine and from Ukraine.

Already after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 2 other resources with a clear pro-Russian position and a considerable audience were blocked: the channels of the blogger Anatoly Shary (primarily YouTube) and the Strana.ua outlet.

It is also important to emphasize that a large number of propagandistic Russian media such as Russia Today and Life have been blocked in Ukraine for a long time (since 2014), while media outlets such as RIA Novosti, Lenta Ru, Gazeta Ru and many others are still available in Ukraine.

The key trend regarding the work of Russian and pro-Russian media in Ukraine is the following: if earlier, by 2021, there was an attempt to build in Ukraine a sustainable media infrastructure that would openly spread Russian narratives at the mainstream level, now pro-Russian media operate in the format of special operations and migrate to such platforms like Telegram as #1, access to which is not blocked yet, and where they can maintain high anonymity and build a large audience quickly (The Telegram channel of the already mentioned pro-Russian blogger Anatoly Shariy has more than 1 million subscribers).

Feature #3. The Telegram turned into a key platform for spreading pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western messages and narratives.

This trend and already the new reality is the result of the process described above, as well as the result of business development of Telegram as such. But one of the main challenges in this regard is that it looks difficult to measure and assess the influence of the Telegram. In March 2023, a public discussion and even advocacy campaign for blocking Telegram as an application, which is controlled by Russian special services and constitutes and poses a threat to Ukraine’s national security, began in Ukraine at the level of experts and officials.

Feature #4. Partial de-oligarchization of the Ukrainian information space.

This is primarily due to the closure of the media business of the richest man in Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov. TV channel “Ukraine”, which has been in the leading position in recent years and its Facebook page still remains in the top 30 most popular pages in terms of the level of interaction in socio-political topics, although the page has not been updated since July 11, 2022 (At the same day Rinat Akhmetov and his SCM announced their withdrawal from the media business).

Feature #5. Legitimately increased attention, reach and interaction on pages in social networks (primarily Facebook) of official state institutions.

This trend is valid for both national (for example, Office of the President, General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) and local authorities (for example, the page of Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovoy) with civil, security and military profiles.

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This appears to be a logical response to the need for reliable information in wartime conditions, in particular after the start of Russia’s massive shelling of civilian infrastructure and as a result – massive power outages and blackouts across the country.

Feature #6. There is an obvious increase in the audience and interaction on Facebook pages that have a geographical connection to the western part of Ukraine.

This is explained by a number of factors: 1) due to Russian aggression, a large number of Ukrainians (IDPs) moved to the west of the country from the east, south, and even the center, including relocated mass media; 2) the western regions of Ukraine were and remain more stable from the point of view of communication, production and consumption of information; 3) unlike a significant part of media from the center, east and south of Ukraine, local and regional media of western Ukraine have retained investors, who are often local oligarchs and representatives of clans; in other words, the oligarchic media of western Ukraine proved to be more stable because their investors did not lose their businesses.

Feature #7. Western media outlets became agenda and narrative setters, as well as the key donor of quality content.

Primarily, it is about such media outlets as the Washington Post and The New York Times, which announced the opening of their offices in Ukraine after the start of the full-scale invasion of Russia, and others. Important to stress in this regard, that until 2014, before Russian aggression started, such role of agenda and narrative setters very often was played by Russian media outlets.

Feature #8. Personal media brands began often to replace and compete with mass media outlets.

For example, in terms of activity and reach, ex-president Petro Poroshenko’s pages on Facebook and Twitter occupy leading positions, using such activity for positioning himself as a “shadow president”.

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Among the most popular Facebook pages within the focus of IRI’s study there are profiles of journalists (Andrii Tsaplienko, Yuriy Butusov), politicians (Petro Poroshenko, Pavlo Klimkin, Oleksiy Arestovich). The development and increasing audience by the personal Telegram-channels is not just a trend already, but a challenge which needs to be studied.

Feature #9. Ukraine-West relations is one of the main topics with high potential of hostility. There is a strong need for a stratcom and policy approach.

Paradoxically, while all opinion polls in Ukraine in 2022 showed an unprecedentedly high level of support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, due to IRI’s research Ukrainian expert and political communities were one of the key sources for anti-NATO and anti-Western messages in Ukraine during the year after the Russian full-scale invasion.

Apart from the big part of most popular messages with hostility towards NATO and the West, which is a part of Ukraine’s advocacy campaign for more military support from the West, led since the very beginning of invasion by president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, there are anti-NATO / Anti-Western sentiments in Ukraine.

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The vast majority (86.1%) of all media content collected in this study was related to the West/NATO topic. That is 1,367,566 pieces out of the 1,588,540. This topic importantly also contains references to military support more generally as well. Therefore, despite the potentially hostile messaging only accounting for 5.96% of the topic’s coverage, it still amounts to 81,494 articles or posts which is larger than the total amount of content discussing refugees or sanctions combined.

These hostile messages were mostly related to Ukrainian perception of such sub-topics as:

Ukrainian demands to NATO / West regarding “closing the sky” and “weapon supply” (Patriot systems, jets, tanks, etc). The main spikes were during March and April 2022, and then during October-November 2022 and January 2023;
discussions about possible peace negotiations initiated by the West and its leaders as the “inclination of Ukraine towards a peace deal with Russia at the expense of Ukraine”. Main spikes were in May and October-November 2022;
Ukraine’s membership in NATO and conditions for it. The main spikes happened after in the end of September president Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly announced that Ukraine applies for NATO membership;

Another sub-topic of hostile messages regarding NATO and West as such widely spread in Ukrainian media space was the idea of NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, which appeared on the agenda at the initiative of the Polish side in March 2022 and was publicly rejected both at the NATO level and at the level of member-states.

The key hostile narratives, which were identified during the annual study, are very straight and oftenly united in one semi-conspiracy theory, which could be formulated like this: “West, NATO and some key member-states are afraid to react properly to Russia’s actions towards Ukraine, are playing double game with Ukraine, just use Ukraine for their own geopolitical purposes via the proxy war approach, don’t want Ukrainian forces to move further to de-occupy the rest of Ukraine, will never give Ukraine a NATO and EU membership, sooner or later they will betray Ukraine as it was with annexation of Crimea and Donbas in 2014, and now is going to incline Ukraine to peace on Russia’s terms and conditions for coming back to business as usual with Russia as soon as possible”.

Starting from February 24, 2022 (and even before that), each “piece” of this conspiracy can often be found in the Ukrainian information space both separately and in combination with others. Moreover, such narratives are spread by both ordinary users and political experts, politicians and high-ranking officials. These hostile messages targeted not just NATO, but exact countries or persons, first of all USA and Biden, Germany and Olaf Scholz (sometimes still Angela Merkel), France and Emmanuel Macron.

The best illustration of such anti-Western rhetoric by the part of pro-Western forces in Ukraine is the reaction to the tragedy in Poland, when a missile of Ukrainian air defense fell on Przewodow, a village just a few kilometers from the Ukrainian border, two people were killed. Here are a few examples of the flood of speculation along with conspiracy frames which are described above. It is important to emphasize that all these were spread by the expert community and politicians with mainly pro-Western orientation, from whom it is rationally expect explainers and management of public expectations, rather than speculations and conspiracy:

Example #1: Youtube interview (more than 1 million views) on November 16 by probably the main Ukrainian public military expert Oleh Zhdanov with narratives: “This is a deliberate strike on the part of Russia”; “Putin raises the stakes and provokes the NATO”, “NATO will swallow this provocation, because they are weaklings”

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Example #2: Facebook post (more than 5K interactions) on November 16 by Volodymyr Parasyuk, former member of Ukrainian Parliament: “NATO is afraid to go to war. Russia is really afraid of NATO! Only Ukraine is not afraid of anything, because we have nothing to fear anymore! In this war, fear became the catalyst for the whole world! Everyone will be looking for 1001 reasons to separate rather than one to put a psychopath in his place! But history does not forgive mistakes and the world has already gone through it once, the price was very high then. A harsh response to the aggressor will not lead to the third world war, but avoiding this response will play its key black role! So they thought a little and continued their work. We still have Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea waiting for us!”

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All these shows the strong need of joint policy interventions: The Ukrainian and international expert community have to switch from the mode of advocating the decisions of their states to an explanatory approach of what decisions are needed and why some decisions couldn’t be made now or never. These expert communities should cooperate more with each other in the format of networks, as well as with media to become the bridge and facilitator between political leaders of the West and Ukraine. International donors should take a lead in creation of such networks and their development into policy oriented task forces.

Feature #10. The key challenge for informational security of Ukraine is not any more Russian disinformation and propaganda, but weak and lack of stratcom and state media interventions to prevent misinformation and conspiracy. Mismanagement of public expectations in a country at war could lead to crisis situations and social traumas.

The case study in this regard is viral energy conspiracy. Since October 30 in the Ukrainian segment of Facebook, as well as media space as such, has started to spread virally the piece of content, in many cases without the original author of the publication, about the conspiracy of fan blackouts in Ukraine. The key narratives, which were spreading within this piece of content, are: 1) there is no objective need for blackouts, there is enough electricity for people; 2) the electricity network of Ukraine is a private property and the real owners, but not Ukrainians and Ukrainian state should restore the damaged grids; 3) all this is the plan of big business to profit and “restore the material base of one’s own business at the expense of the state and foreign donors”.

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The author of initial post of this conspiracy is real person Anatoliy Yaroshenko (Yaroved) from Chernihiv (the Ukrainian city in the north of the country) with no clear ties to any political or foreign actor. Interestingly, that initial post as such was not so viral (more than 900 likes, approx 200 comments and 1,3K shares), but the content of the post became viral and was re-published by many others (As an example, first and second) in social media.

During November this conspiracy, as well as fan blackout as such, was used by Russian and pro-Russian actors to provoke riots and protests in Odesa (in the south of Ukraine, Ukrainian Black Sea port): on November 18th, after the massive shelling by Russia on November 15, group of locals blocked one of the street calling Odesa officials to manage the situation (people complained for 3 days without electricity and any information from authorities). The same and for the same reason had happened on November 19. Russian and pro-Russian actors used Telegram as the main channel for stocking tension (One of Telegram-channel through, which were used to provoke protests in Odesa, has official title in its disclaimer as the “Digital Army of Russia”) and spreading mis- and disinformation in this regard.

Moreover, since November another conspiracy became viral: Ukraine is selling electricity to Europe while Ukrainians suffer without electricity. Important to highlight that this conspiracy was spread (from 6:22 in this video Yulia Tymoshenko is talking about the export of electricity from Ukraine to Hungary despite Ukrainian officials many times refuted this fact, explaining that there was and is electricity flows in the joint system ( ENTSO-E), but not export. The video is taken from the United News TV Marathon, where Yulia Tymoshenko was invited as the speaker) also by a prominent Ukrainian politician with basically pro-Western orientation Yulia Tymoshenko, using her credibility as ex-prime minister of Ukraine and ex-deputy prime minister for the fuel and energy complex.

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Hostile narrative research is conducted with the support of the International Republican Institute’s Beacon Project. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of IRI.

Cover photo: Serhiy Hudak

Seven Reasons Why Ukraine’s Restoration Should Start with its Western Border

International investments in Ukraine’s border infrastructure will have a positive effect.

With the Ukrainian forces successfully resisting the Russian army’s offensive in the critical first days of the invasion, a growing number of European experts and politicians have begun discussing Ukraine’s victory as well as how to restore and modernize the country in order to integrate it into the EU and NATO. In other words, they are drawing up a new Marshall Plan.

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Figures like President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky and Head of the European Council Charles Michel have already underscored that this rebuilding should start even if Ukraine is still at war with Russia.

Kyiv must thus begin with investing in key areas such as infrastructure. This applies to those parts of Ukraine that the Russian army has razed to the ground and areas that ensure a reliable, fast, and diversified connection between Ukraine and the West. After all, not only has the country become part of the latter, but it also heavily relies on it.

Investments in infrastructure have always fueled development. In Ukraine’s case, it is also provides the foundation for resilience. The border infrastructure in western Ukraine, which neighbors EU and NATO member states, is Ukraine’s current lifeline and gate into the future.

In this article, we outline seven reasons why the restoration of embattled Ukraine must start with the Western border’s modernization. Foremost, the reconstruction and development of new checkpoints.

1. If we indeed choose to commence Ukraine’s restoration and modernization while the country is still battling with the Russian army, we need to focus on those areas and objects that are least susceptible to Russia’s attacks. Ukraine-EU/NATO checkpoints fall into that category. Because these objects are civilian and close to NATO territory, Russia is unlikely to bomb them and initiate an open armed conflict with NATO, which protects its territories via Article 5 of the organization’s Treaty.

2. New checkpoints at Ukraine’s western border are an export/import matter. Our country is critically dependent on receiving humanitarian aid and gas that the country is short of at the moment. The export of Ukrainian goods, such as crops, contributes to the country’s budget.

In some respects, Kyiv and its neighbors are already addressing the problem, with Poland and Ukraine creating a special line for the freight carriers to import gas. Similarly, Slovakia and Ukraine launched a special line at the Uzhorod checkpoint for freight carriers. It, therefore, makes sense to develop and approve decisions based on the Integrated Border Management (IBM) principle, making Ukraine’s western border systematically more effective in critical conditions. For instance, avoiding situations, where the changes in the customs clearance of used cars (that resulted in increased demand) led, though temporarily, to huge queues at the border.

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3. The checkpoints are an enticing investment option even outside the so-called Marshall Plan. More so since Ukraine has recent experience in that respect: in 2014, the EU allotted over 29 million euros to reconstruct six checkpoints on Ukraine’s western border.

4. Unfortunately, however, Ukraine failed to put these funds to use properly. As a result, in 2018, the EU terminated the funding, demanding that Ukraine reimburse these funds. It will, therefore, be difficult to convince the EU to participate in this sort of project once again. Yet should Ukraine succeed and spend the money properly, the outcome’s effectiveness will be amplified, compensating for the reputational losses. It would also reduce the EU’s prejudice toward Ukraine, with the county proving that it has changed, is ready to be effective and European, and keep promises.

5. In the past several years, the mantra of renovating and creating checkpoints has gone through all stages of ‘Ukrainian bureaucratic hell’. Accordingly, the stakeholders have formed priority lists and prepared all the necessary paperwork and international agreements. The situation looks all the brighter since just several months before Russia launched an all-out war in Ukraine, the Ukrainian government unveiled the “Big Renovation” of Ukraine’s western border, finishing the reconstruction of checkpoints like Krasnoilsk and Dyakivtsi at the Romanian border alongside Uzhorod at the Ukraine-Slovakia border. Free from the red tape, these checkpoints are of primary interest to the investors.

These developments are part of the Integrated Bundorder Management (IBM) Strategy, the implementation of which against the backdrop of war also becomes an important security factor. One should not underestimate the emotional and political effect that the completion and launch of these checkpoints will have in the short term. It would be an important signal from Ukraine to all Ukrainians: the renovation has begun.

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6. By modernizing old checkpoints or creating new ones, Ukraine will pave the way for the creation of new supply links. It is vital that Ukraine is integrated into the process of creating new trade routes, especially since many Ukrainian businesses had to relocate to the western regions. It is likewise a great way for enhancing the dialogue with Ukraine’s neighbors not just politically but also at the level of mutual interests, trade, and regional development.

7. Checkpoints are ideal for creating jobs at every stage of their development – from building the premises to employing border guards who continuously nag about being understaffed. Their modernization and development also support many branches of the economy, enhancing the ability of western Ukraine to help out the regions that have suffered from Russia’s aggression the most. Today, every western region has turned into a humanitarian hub. The improvement of the border infrastructure would only serve to enhance the effort.

***

For all these arguments to become part of concrete actions aimed at the development, reconstruction, or modernization of Ukraine’s western border it is necessary to carry out extra planning and budgeting. The Integrated Border Management Strategy approved by the Ukrainian government would help to do so fast and effectively. It must now be done without ado.

The article was created as part of the project “The Multicomponent Civil Support in the area of Integrated Border Management” implemented by the “Europe without Barriers” NGO within the project “EU’s support in reinforcing Integrated Border Management (EU4IBM)”, financed by the European and implemented by the ICMPD.

** The opinions expressed in the article belong to the authors only. They do not necessarily reflect the EU or ICMPD’s stance.

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Це суспільно-політичне видання, яке розповідає українській аудиторії про національні меншини, а їм – про сучасну Україну. Ціль Infopost.Media – посилити національний діалог та згуртованість, протидіяти дезінформації та маніпуляціям, а також повернути Україну в її рідний дім – вільну спільну мультикультурну Європу.

Why the Ukrainian Victory is Important for the World? 10 reasons from the American historian Timothy Snyder

At the invitation of the Kyiv Security Forum, prominent American historian Timothy Snyder named ten reasons why Ukraine’s victory in the war against Russia is important to humanity. Here is his speech.

I’m Timothy Snyder, I’m historian and I’ve been asked to speak to you about the significance of a Ukrainian victory.

We’re all thinking about victory or at least the end of the war as we get into May. What I’m about to speak to you about is the significance of this war and how this war might end or how this war must end.

Тімоті Снайдер

The first perhaps the most fundamental is that Ukraine’s victory, I believe, is the only way to achieve peace. Presumably all same people would like for this war to come to an end. I believe that a victory by Ukraine is the only way by which this war can come to an end. A Russian victory will lead to further Russian aggression. A Ukrainian capitulation will lead to the continuation of policies of atrocity on Ukrainian soil. The one way I believe that this war could actually end is with a Ukrainian victory, that is with sufficient Ukrainian success on the field of battle that Russia believes that is in its interest to negotiate.

Secondly, I believe the Ukrainian victory is important for the security of the region. The only way that Ukrainian population could be protected is by way of Ukrainian victory. But I believe it is also very significant for the populations of the Baltic countries, of Poland, of Romania, of Moldova that Russian aggression against the neighboring country not succeed.

The third reason I believe that Ukrainian victory is important has to do above all with the citizens of Ukraine. There is no other way to protect the citizens of Ukraine, I believe, then by Ukrainian victory. So long as the war continues Ukrainian citizens under Russian occupation are subjects to deportation, another forms of atrocity. Ukrainians not under Russian occupation are vulnerable to bombing and shots. The only way to secure the 40 million Ukrainians is the world to cease, and the only way for the world to cease is by way of Ukrainian victory.

The fourth reason, extremely important I believe, has to do with the defense of a democracy. One reason this war is being fought is that Ukraine is a democracy. Ukraine has that kind of unpredictable political system which throws up unpredictable combinations, unpredictable leaders. It’s that unpredictability, it’s that inability to know what’s going to come next that I think is so intolerable for Mr. Putin and for this kind of Russian regime. So one reason why it’s important for Ukraine to win this war is for a democracy to protect itself.

But I believe, and this is my next point number five, that this is important for democracies as such. Were Russia to win this war that would be tremendous victory for all forces that oppose democracy, for all people who are planning to use violence of one kind or another to overthrow democracies. If Ukraine wins that is a victory for those who believe in law, who wish to hold elections, who wish to hold their leaders accountable, and especially for those who are willing to take risks for all those important things.

Relatedly, and this is reason number six, that a victory by Ukraine is also a victory by a state which is traditionally been seen as peripheral, which is traditionally been seen as colonial against a power which was like to see itself as central and as imperial. Imperial wars as we know, especially from the nineteenth and twentieth century, belong to a certain phase of political development. Imperial wars will continue so long as imperial powers believe that they can win them. Every European power and plenty of other powers reach a point where they realize that they will be exhausted by imperial war and that is, frankly, a very good thing, a good thing for everyone concerned. So because this is an imperial war, a war which Russian leadership claims that there’s no Ukrainian people, there’s no Ukrainian state, a victory by Ukraine is important to defend the basic principle that nations are equal and states deserve respect. Another words, victory by Ukraine is one more push towards a post-imperial world.

Speaking of a post-imperial world, my seventh reason for believing that Ukrainian victory is important has to do with a recollection of the World War II. In Mr. Putin’s telling, the lesson of a World War II is that we need more war. In Mr. Putin’s telling, the lesson of the defeat of fascism is that we need more fascism. In Mr. Putin’s telling, the lesson of the defeat of imperialism is that we need more imperialism. In Mr. Putin’s telling, the lesson of the World War II is that the word “Nazi” just means whatever he wants it to mean and can be deployed as hate speech against whoever happens to be his enemy of choice. That is one reading of a World War II. It’s not a reading of a World War II that should prevail.

I think it’s very important, as this war is being fought, to consider it, assuming the people are doing it, in the light of a World war II. But in particular to consider it as an opportunity to preserve certain virtues which many of us believe were reinforced by that war or should have been reinforced by that war. Toleration for difference, for example. The importance of the rule of law and pluralism, for example. The importance of cooperation among democracies, for example. Dayosh Kiev

Number eight. I believe that Ukrainian victory is also very important for the future of Russia. Now to be very clear, I don’t expect Ukrainians to be thinking about this factor, but for the rest of us who are concerned about the security of Europe and security of the world it’s very important what kind of Russia we’ll be living alongside in decades to come. For Russia to become let’s call it a normal country where Russian interests are observed by Russian leaders, it’s very important that Russia loses this war. It’s very important that Russians cease to pursue a foreign policy which is about gathering land on a basis of entirely untenable myths. I believe it’s very important for Russia, for Russians and for future Russian governments to be in a position to think instead about the future of Russia and about the reality of Russian interests. And I think a defeat on a battlefield here, although I wish there weren’t a battlefield and I wish there weren’t a war, I believe that defeat on the battlefield here will be a step forward towards that kind of Russia. Russia where Russians are able to think about a future away from imperialism. Russia where the past perhaps weighs a bit less heavily as myths on the decisions of the President. And Russia where interests can be considered and the future can be considered.

Number nine. Ukraine must win this war because Ukraine, as everyone knows, is a major source of food for the rest of the world. In the history of twentieth century Ukraine has been an object of colonization from all sides, because of its fertile soil. In a present war we observe as Russia illegally expropriates Ukrainian agricultural products and we watch as Russia illegally blockades the rest of the world from Ukrainian agricultural exports. Should this war continue it in this way, people in Africa, in the Middle East and elsewhere are going to be threatened with anticipated and then real food shortages. Which will have the consequence not only, I believe, in hunger and death, but also of political instability along the way. Ukrainian victory and reopening of world trade will prevent all of that.

Tenth finally, last but not least, and in some ways summing up all of these other points. Ukrainian victory is necessary to help point not just Ukrainians but all the rest of us towards the future. In a way the problem of Russian propaganda is a problem that we all share perhaps in less sharp form. Russian propaganda is all about the past, it’s all about the how things are predetermined, it’s all about seeking some kind of moment at some point in history where we were right and everyone else was wrong. But that is not what we need. We, everyone needs a future. We need a politics of the future; we need an event that can break us out of our rut and which will point us towards a future. I believe it’s very important that Europeans and others help to offer Ukrainians a future after this war in the form of membership in the European Union, and in the form of generous aid which allows Ukrainians to rebuild.

But I think the process goes two ways. I think if we are open-minded and generous about the way we look at Ukraine, about how we look at this war, we can see that Ukrainians are also offering a future to us.

Hadn’t Ukrainians not fought, had Ukrainians capitulated, our future, the future of democracy would look very bleak right now. Because Ukrainians did resist, because Ukrainians are fighting they’ve bought other democracies a certain amount of time.

I think this time should be used to think about the future. Not just a future in which Ukraine joins other democracies in different forms of cooperation, but also a future in a broader sense where a Ukrainian victory demonstrates that individual action matters, that people can take responsibility, that the range of possibility is broader than we think, that there are things that can happen in the future that perhaps are better than we think.

Ukraine or Ukrainian victory also point us in that direction.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Ця публікація доступна також українською мовою: Чому перемога України важлива для світу? 10 причин від американського історика Тімоті Снайдера

Ez a kiadvány magyar nyelven is elérhető: Miért fontos Ukrajna győzelme a világ számára? 10 ok Timothy Snyder amerikai történésztől

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Slovak social networks talk about NATO biolab in Azovstal bunker

Anonymous users continue to spread pro-russian fakes about biolaboratories in Ukraine on Slovak social networks. This time, Ján Novák’s post, which is dedicated to pro-Kremlin disinformation, received 1.6 shares and about a thousand comments.

The user wrote that under the Azovstal plant there is an armored bunker with a biolaboratory, in which 240 foreign NATO officers are trapped. On the basis of this laboratory, biological weapons were allegedly tested, killing thousands of Mariupol residents.

Pictures of the bunker were also distributed by Russian Twitter users. This was reported by researchers of the Mediamonitoring project.

Безымянный 1

According to researchers, оne anonymous user’s publication contained many different pro-Russian narratives such as biological weapons in Ukraine, foreign administration, foreign mercenaries, and Ukraine’s long-standing preparations for war. The material is created on the principle of “the more nonsense, the more people will believe it.”

However, all its absurdity is refuted by a reverse image search on Google, which shows that the top-secret bunker under Azovstal is “in fact a visualization of a bunker in the United States, invented in the event of an apocalypse.” To emphasize the authenticity of the disinformers, they painted @savunmaisleri on the picture, which is used by the Turkish news agency, which specializes in advanced defense technologies.

Ця публікація доступна також українською: Словацькі боти стверджують, що в бункері під “Азовсталлю” знаходиться біолабораторія НАТО

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Photo: Mediamonitoring

Hungarian 2022 elections and the Hungarian national minority in Ukraine

On April 3, 2022, many Ukrainian citizens of Hungarian origin will vote in Hungarian parliamentary elections. Because dual citizenship is officially banned in Ukraine the exact number these voters are not disclosed by the Hungarian authorities, though up to 40,000 Ukrainian citizens have voted in Hungarian elections since 2014.

The possibility for Hungarians abroad to vote in elections is at the core of an enormous architecture of efforts to support and engage Hungarian communities in neighboring countries, created, politically monopolized and systematically used by the ruling Fidesz-KDNP alliance led by Viktor Orbán.

The ultimate value of voters from Ukraine very much depends on the final turnout. Although 40,000 votes can’t guarantee even a single seat in parliament, they could prove decisive in some constituencies near the Ukrainian border, or on elections as a whole in case of a neck and neck contest. Experience from previous elections gives cause for deep concerns about the engagement of these voters in electoral fraud with questionable registration and “voter tourism.” Ukrainian citizens with Hungarian passports will most likely vote in Hungarian elections given the ongoing war and their participation may challenge the legitimacy and integrity of these parliamentary elections.

Hungarian National Minority In Ukraine

Moreover, Ukrainian citizens will be engaged in Hungarian elections against the backdrop of the deepest political crisis in bilateral relations between Hungary and Ukraine, which are at their lowest level in modern history. This crisis formally started in 2017 with debates regarding the newly adopted Ukrainian educational law, but since then this has expanded to cover all sensitive issues of bilateral relations. In particular: dual citizenship, Hungarian state funds in Ukraine, language and other minority rights of Hungarians, Ukraine’s integration towards EU and NATO, Russian malign and disinformation campaigns, interference into elections and internal affairs, national security, corruption, etc.

Hungarian community in Ukraine. Background

Ethnic Hungarians have lived in territories that are now the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine (Zakarpattia oblast, in Hungarian Kárpátalja) since the migration of Hungarian tribes to the Carpathian Basin at the turn of the 9th and 10th centuries. In Hungarian historiography this is referred to as “honfoglalás” – “conquest of the homeland” and considered by Hungarians as their historical lands, and themselves as indigenous people.

According to the last official Ukrainian census, conducted in 2001, a total of 156.6 thousand ethnic Hungarians live in Ukraine, which is 0.3% of the country’s population. At the same time, 151.5 thousand Hungarians live in the Transcarpathian region, which is 12.1% of the region’s population.

In 2017, with the financial support of the Hungarian government, a SUMMA 2017 survey was conducted to determine the actual number of Hungarians living in Ukraine, particularly in Transcarpathia. According to results 125,000 Hungarians and 6,000 Roma who identify as Hungarians live in Transcarpathia, and thus a total of 131,000, according to the research.

While not the majority, Hungarians still constitute a significant population in the main municipalities of the Transcarpathian region, including, Uzhhorod, Mukachevo, Vynohradiv, Khust. Berehove (Beregszász) in particular as it is the unofficial centre of Hungarian community with ethnic Hungarians mayors for the last decades, host to the editorial offices of several Hungarian-language outlets, and the Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian College of Higher Education – the only Hungarian-language higher education institution in Ukraine, which is a kind of hub of various Hungarian institutions, including funds, endowments, etc.

Hungarian minority of Ukraine in political agenda of Budapest

The Hungarian community in Transcarpathia is not considered by the Hungarian government as diaspora, but as “Hungarians abroad” (külhoni magyarok), along with other Hungarian communities in neighboring countries living in the territories of so-called Greater Hungary, the pre-Trianon Peace Treaty Kingdom of Hungary. Hungary lost about a third of ethnic Hungarians and two-thirds of its territories in the post-First World War settlement.

“Trianon Trauma” is one of the key drivers of Hungarian government policy towards ethnic Hungarians living abroad, particularly under the Fidesz-KDNP. Supporting Hungarians abroad is not only a constitutional duty, but also a separate national policy of the government “Nemzetpolitikai”. Its essence is to preserve identity and communities in historical Hungarian lands, as well as unite the Hungarian nation across borders. The basis of the policy is not only to support Hungarian communities abroad through loans, grants or cultural projects, but to create autonomies of various kinds, from cultural and educational to political and territorial.

In practice, this includes creating and maintaining of closed Hungarian-language education systems from kindergartens to university, a network of cultural organizations that are simultaneously ethnic political parties for elections and funds to receive Hungarian government support.

Dual citizenship, along with political demands to legalize it, is a significant part of the Fidesz-KDNP government’s national policy. Since 1 January 2011, Hungarians abroad could obtain Hungarian citizenship through the simplified naturalization procedure. Ukrainian legislation does not officially recognize dual citizenship, but there is a gap in the legislation that (unlike Slovakia) prevents Ukrainian citizens from being punished for having a second passport. According to the latest public data released by the Hungarian authorities, as of February 2015, almost 94,000 Ukrainian citizens received Hungarian citizenship under a simplified naturalization procedure. At the same time, as of August 2015, a total of 124,000 applications for Hungarian citizenship were received from Ukraine.

In Transcarpathia, there is an extensive network of public and private (mostly at the churches) kindergartens and schools with Hungarian language education, as well as the high educational unit in Berehove, already mentioned.

The two main cultural and political organizations of the Hungarian community of Transcarpathia are:

the KMKSZ (Kárpátaljai Magyar Kulturális Szövetség, The Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association or The Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia as translated by the KMKSZ itself, the leader is László Brenzovics.
the UMDSZ (Ukrajnai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, Hungarian Democratic Union of Ukraine). The leader is László Zubánics.

These organizations continue to compete with each other rather than cooperate. KMKSZ is a political ally of the ruling Fidesz party. UMDSZ is a political ally of the opposition Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which lost its popularity, influence along with its status of Hungary’s main opposition party, 12 years ago. Consequently, KMKSZ is not only stronger due to access to Hungarian governmental support, but in recent years has tried to absorb UMDSZ and establish a political monopoly in the Hungarian community of Ukraine. This was noticeable during local elections (2020) in Ukraine, when several powerful members of UMDSZ ran as candidates from KMKSZ, which was formally presented as a joint list to the Transcarpathian Regional Council and KMKSZ won eight seats. Zoltán Babják, who is formally a representative of the UMDSZ, ran in 2020 as a self-nominated candidate with the support of both Hungarian political forces, was re-elected mayor of Berehove.

Currently, the Hungarian community does not have a representative in the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada), because all three Hungarian majority candidates lost the elections in 2019. The last representative of the Hungarian community in the Verkhovna Rada was László Brenzovics, elected in 2014 on the Petro Poroshenko Bloc list.

There are several funds in Transcarpathia that support the Hungarian community with money from the Hungarian government. The main ones are the Bethlen Gábor Fund, which operates throughout Hungary and abroad, and the Egán Ede Fund, which was launched in Ukraine in 2016. The activities of these funds in Ukraine, or the funds themselves are under control of the KMKSZ and its leadership.

According to the data of the Hungarian Money investigative project, between 2011 and 2020, Transcarpathia received almost 36 billion forints, or about 115 million euros, from the Hungarian government just through the Bethlen Gábor Fund. Of these, Transcarpathian parishes received more than 6.8 billion forints (almost 22 million euros). Another € 62 million was spent on educational institutions, educational programs and travel, books and the reconstruction of schools and kindergartens. Another example: the Egan Ede Fund was established under a special program of financial support for small and medium-sized businesses in Transcarpathia with a budget of 32 billion HUF (at that time almost 104 million euros) for the period 2016-2019. Transcarpathian teachers who teach in Hungarian receive annual subsidies through these foundations.

In 2016, “special envoy” of Hungarian government was established to coordinate Hungarian national policy in Transcarpathia, which has been held for two terms by István Grezsa.

These organizations and foundations also support local media, which mostly work in Hungarian, or cover information about the Hungarian community and Hungary, creating another closed autonomous network. This Hungarian media network in Transcarpathia includes several websites, newspapers, radio and even a TV channel. You can learn more about these media in this report.

National and cultural autonomy is guaranteed to Hungarians by Article 6 of the Law “On National Minorities in Ukraine”. Hungarians also have the right to use their national symbols, and for example, the Hungarian flag can be seen, for instance, at administrative buildings, in particular at the City Hall of Berehove. The political demand for territorial autonomy was on the regional agenda of Transcarpathia during the 1990s; there were even several projects and initiatives to create a separate Hungarian district as an administrative-territorial unit. In a way, this idea was implemented in the form of the Hungarian majority constituency, which existed in the 2002 parliamentary elections. This political demand is still on the agenda as part of the overall vision of national policy of Hungary in Ukraine and Transcarpathia, but without any political grounding or even conceptualization. The idea of Hungarian autonomy was largely shelved following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 through creating pseudo-republics, and made further irrelevant by decentralization reforms in 2014-2020 that shifted much power to municipalities enabling them to in an case operate with greater autonomy. The last time the issue of Hungarian territorial autonomy was raised at the national level was during changes to the administrative-territorial structure of the Transcarpathian region in 2020. At that time 13 districts were consolidated in 6, and Berehove district with the center in Berehove was preserved. In the new version of the Berehove district, the share of Hungarians will be reduced from 76% to 43% (based on the 2001 census).

However, the issue of Hungarian autonomy in Transcarpathia, or its separation from Ukraine and accession to Hungary, is raised in the media in the form of statements by Hungarian right-wing radical politicians and during hybrid special operations, mostly of Russian origin.

As of December 2014, 91.5% of Transcarpathians saw the future of their region as part of a unitary Ukraine. As of December 2018, 81% of Transcarpathians believe that Transcarpathia will be part of a unitary Ukraine, and only 3% – for autonomy within the federation, and 1% – for secession from Ukraine. As of 2020, only 3% of Transcarpathians are in favor of the region’s autonomy within the federal Ukraine, and less than 1% – for the independence of Transcarpathia or its accession to another state.

Ukrainian-Hungarian relations and political tensions: context of last 5 years

Currently bilateral relations between Kyiv and Budapest are at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in the early 1990s.

Tensions formally started after the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed a new education law in September 2017. Article 7 of the law stipulated that “the language of the educational process in educational institutions is the state language”, i.e. Ukrainian. According to the law national minorities, including Hungarians, would retain the right to study in their native language alongside Ukrainian thru the fourth grade after which they would have to gradually switch to Ukrainian. Certain subjects could continue to be taught in English or one of the official EU languages, meaning Hungarian, Romanian, Slovak, Polish and others, but not Russian. A new law adopted in January 2020, concerning general secondary education, clarified that till the fourth grade all subjects, except Ukrainian language subject, can be taught in the native language; in fifth grade Ukrainian language should be used in at least 20% of all “teaching hours” (not subjects) increasing to 40% by the ninth grade and to 60% in the 10th and 11th grades. Focus on “teaching hours” and not of subjects in the law open opened the big possibility for developing bilingual or even multilingual education.

Immediately after 2017 educational law was adopted, the Hungarian community in Ukraine and official Budapest perceived it as an attempt to assimilate, an attack on identity, a breach of Kyiv’s previous commitments to Hungary and internationally, and a narrowing of national minority rights.

Following this, Ukrainian-Hungarian diplomatic tension turned into a deep systemic crisis of bilateral relations over all key issues:

1) dual citizenship and distribution of Hungarian passports to ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine, which Budapest has been actively doing in Transcarpathia since 2011 contrary to Ukrainian legislation which does not recognize dual-citizenship;

2) new Ukrainian education and language laws, regulations of the using Hungarian language in public sphere and call for giving official regional status to it in Transcarpathia, as well as official status for Hungarians as indigenous people;

3) rights for different types of autonomy (cultural, political, territorial, etc.) for the Hungarian community in Ukraine;

4) use of Hungarian symbols in the public sphere, in particular flags on administrative buildings;

5) creation of a “Hungarian district” in Ukraine as an administrative unit for some territorial autonomy, as well as prospects for the restoration of the so-called Hungarian electoral constituency, which operated within Transcarpathia during the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections and guaranteed the representation of the Hungarian national minority in Ukrainian Parliament;

6) European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine (immediately after Kyiv’s adoption of the law on education, Budapest started blocking Ukraine’s EU and NATO ambitions, in particular using its veto on the Ukraine-NATO ministerial-level commission and other minor decisions;

7) Hungarian officials’ interference into the Parliamentary elections in 2019 and local elections in 2020 elections in Ukraine, as well as into Ukraine’s internal affairs;

8) Russian “soft- and gas-power” in Hungary towards Ukraine, as well as Russia’s malign influence and hostile hybrid operations to provoke Ukrainian-Hungarian confrontation over the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia;

9) financial support of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia region by the Hungarian government, its transparency and coordination with the Ukrainian authorities. According to Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, as of 2020, the Hungarian government has invested more than 250 million € (90 billion HUF) in the Transcarpathian region through various programs;

10) operation of Hungarian funds in Transcarpathia and the investigation of their activities by the Ukrainian security service;

Each of these issues is still on the agenda of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations. For the last five years Kyiv and Budapest adopted different approaches but have been unable to resolve any of these key topics.

Moreover, along with debates over this list of Ukrainian-Hungarian issues, Ukraine and Hungary mutually expelled consuls and numerous state officials from both sides were banned for entering the neighboring country. Ukrainian security service initiated an official investigation into the Egán Ede Fund, and personally against its president László Brenzovics, who left Ukraine after the SBU searched his house in Uzhhorod in late November 2020. Since autumn 2020, the state secretary for national policy, Árpád János Potápi, as well as the special envoy of the Hungarian government, István Grezsa, are persona non grata in Ukraine for interference into Ukrainian elections and internal affairs.

According to a survey commissioned by the Institute for Central European Strategy and conducted by the Democratic Initiative Foundation in all regions of Ukraine, except the occupied territories in late 2021, 41,4% of Ukrainians think that Hungary’s current policy towards the Hungarian minority residing in Zakarpattia – particularly with respect to financing schools, teachers, and grants for entrepreneurs – “aims at preparing a possible annexation and occupation of these territories to Hungary”. Only 19,9% think “this is really a friendly aid for the Hungarian minority of Zakarpattia” and 18,4% believe it “is conducive to the development of the region as long as these activities of the Hungarian government are coordinated with the Ukrainian government”.

20 2 (1)

According to another survey, conducted just in Transcarpathia region year before, locals answered almost the same question totally different with 31,5% stating that Hungarian governmental policy towards Zakarpattia is “really friendly support assistance to Hungarian minority”, and 40% answered that this contributes to regional development.

12 Eng Ver (2)

Despite ongoing political and diplomatic debates it is important to emphasize that according to the both polls mentioned above, there is no tension or hostility on the people-to-people level.

8 Eng Ver 2 (1)

In the wake of Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Hungarian government, on one hand, supported basic sanctions against Russia and received refugees from Ukraine, but other the hand, Viktor Orbán stated that Hungary must “stay out of the war” and the Hungarian government doesn’t plan to supply Ukraine with weapons as well as banning the possibility to transport weapons through Hungary directly to Ukraine. This lays the ground for a new wave of Ukrainian-Hungarian tensions.

Hungarian minority of Ukraine in Hungarian Parliamentary elections 2022

Starting in the 2014 parliamentary elections, Hungarians abroad, who have Hungarian citizenship as a second (dual), can also vote. Such Hungarians have citizenship without registration in Hungary, so they can only vote for party lists. This is 93 seats out of 199. Another 106 members of the Hungarian parliament are elected by majority constituencies, and are voted for by Hungarian citizens with a residence permit in the respective constituency.

Hungarians abroad without registration in Hungary can vote by mail. To do this, they must register for postal voting. The deadline for postal voting on April 3, 2022 is March 9.

This is the legal framework for Hungarians of Ukraine to participate in elections in Hungary. The exact number of such voters in Ukraine is non-public information due to the fact that dual citizenship is officially illegal in Ukraine. In this report, we have already provided data how many ethnic Hungarians live in Ukraine according to official census in 2001 (151,5 thousand), the number of applications for Hungarian citizenship as of 2015 (124 thousand), as well as the results of a survey of Hungarian scientists in 2017, how many Hungarians actually live in Transcarpathia (131 thousand).

However, another figure that gives an approximate understanding of the share of Hungarian voters in Ukraine is the number of voters who voted for Hungarian parties in the last election. In particular, the number of voters who voted for the KMKSZ party as the only Hungarian in the elections to the Transcarpathian Regional Council.

In the local elections of 2015 it was 41,517 votes, in the last local elections in 2020 it was 39,049 votes.

This is exactly the number of Hungarian voters that the ruling Fidesz-KDNP can count on, which since 2010 has increased influence on Hungarians abroad in neighboring countries through governmental programs of support and local political allies, almost in status of the satellites.

Since the Hungarians abroad received the right to vote, only the Jobbik party has tried to intensify its work in Transcarpathia, but without success. Today, there is every reason to say that Fidesz-KDNP has a monopoly on influencing the Hungarian electorate in Ukraine.

Due to the difficult bilateral relations of recent years, as well as the de facto ban on dual citizenship in Ukraine, campaigning of Hungarian politicians in Transcarpathia is not possible. But this fact is compensated by the indirect and covert campaigning of the ruling Fidesz-KDNP team through Hungarian government policy and politics in the Transcarpathian region.

The influence of the mentioned about 40,000 votes of Transcarpathian Hungarians on the final result of the parliamentary elections in Hungary is determined by the turnout mainly. In the last parliamentary elections in 2018, the turnout was 70%, which is 5,791,868 votes. In 2014 – almost 62%, and it was 5,047,363 voters. Extremely simplistic mathematical calculations make it clear that neither with the turnout of 62% or 70%, 40 thousand voters do not give a single seat in parliament.

According to preliminary forecasts, the historically high turnout is expected on April 3, 2022, which further reduces the importance of the votes of Hungarians from Transcarpathia.

However, already several reliable journalistic investigations show that Transcarpathian Hungarians could vote in the 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections not only for party lists, but also for majoritarian candidates in single-member constituencies on the basis of fictitious residences. This phenomenon is already known as “voter tourism” and it is very relevant for the eastern regions of Hungary bordering Ukraine, in particular the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg region.

For example, between the 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections, the official population of village of Kispalád near Ukrainian-Hungarian border changed in few times – from 623 inhabitants in 2014 to 1296 in 2018 and once again to 630 inhabitants in October 2021.

The scheme is such that on election day, Hungarian voters are brought by bus from Ukraine to border settlements where they have a legal residence permit (although they do not live there), and these voters vote for both party lists and majoritarian candidates. And in this case, the weight of the already mentioned above 40 thousand votes from Ukraine is growing.

At the same time, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24 2022, created conditions for the election campaign in the context of war, humanitarian catastrophe and migration crisis. According to the UN, as of March 12, Hungary had received 246,206 refugees from Ukraine. It is impossible to count exactly how many, but it is possible that among the refugees from Ukraine there are also ethnic Hungarians with a second Hungarian passport, who if not yet registered in Hungary, may still have time to get it before the election day and be included in the voter lists in constituency levels. This can be done no later than 7 days before election day, as the deadline.

Given all this, despite the relatively small number of potential voters from Ukraine, their participation in the Parliamentary elections in Hungary on April 3, 2022 may affect the results in individual constituencies, as well as undermine the legitimacy and integrity of the elections in general.

* This report as a part of the “Election Monitoring in Hungary and its Diaspora” research is conducted with the support of the International Republican Institute’s Beacon Project. It is conducted in Hungary and select countries with a significant Hungarian diaspora: Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine.

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Source: International Republican Institute, The Beacon Project

Featured photo illustration by János Nemes/MTI