The defeat of Europe

When politicians and analysts in European countries comment on the consequences of Ukraine’s defeat in the war with Russia, their views tend to fall into two groups. 

The first group believes that such a defeat would be a problem primarily for Ukraine, with the possible exception of creating serious migration problems for its neighbors. Yet, Russia will not risk war with NATO, and even if it does continue its aggressive campaign, it will be confined to the former Soviet republics. Wasn’t this the approach that guided Finland and Sweden to abandon their neutral status and join the Alliance?

The second group, on the contrary, believes that, as the saying goes “the more you have, the more you want”, and Ukraine’s defeat will mean the beginning of a major war in Europe. They believe that, seeing the sluggishness of the West, Putin will not fear its military and technical superiority. And does this superiority exist at all when it comes to conventional weapons? The war in Ukraine has demonstrated it does not.

As we can see, the positions of both groups are totally opposite. And those who believe in peace outnumber those who fear war as a consequence of Ukraine’s defeat. Consequently, Europeans and the West in general perceive this war through the prism of compassion rather than a serious threat to their own security. And even the dire warnings of some leading politicians that we have been hearing lately do little to convince anyone.

Yet if we look at the consequences of Ukraine’s defeat in terms of political change rather than military danger, the picture will seem much grimmer, not only for those who believe in war, but also for those who believe in peace. In either case, we will be dealing with frightened and frustrated societies at whose borders Russia will suddenly appear. And if we do hope for peace, shouldn’t it be based on coexistence with Russia?

This is not even a theoretical assumption.

In fact, such a model of existence already exists in Hungary and Slovakia, whereas in the Czech Republic, the sentiment of coexistence with Russia has always been in the political mainstream, except that the war with Russia changed it. But let’s not forget that these three countries were victims of the Soviet invasion in the postwar years. And the trauma of this invasion determined the survival practices of both Hungary and Czechoslovakia for decades ahead (the pressure was always more aggressive in Slovakia, as a “peripheral” republic, than in Prague, just as the pressure of the authorities was always more aggressive in the Ukrainian SSR than in it was in Moscow). 

When politicians like Victor Orbán in Hungary, Vladimír Mečiar and later Robert Fico in Slovakia, who learned to play on this trauma, emerged, they turned out to be almost indispensable leaders for a large part of society that lives by survival values. Because this is a historically fearful society, a society in which grandfathers explain to their grandchildren how important it is to never again meet a Russian tank on their own street.

And now let’s imagine a situation where a Russian tank returns to Lviv or Uzhhorod, and Russian missiles are deployed at the Yavoriv training ground. Wouldn’t this lead to the whole of Central Europe becoming a “greater Hungary”?

Today, such a statement may seem like political fiction, especially against the backdrop of a major split at the level of the Visegrad Group. 

But all of us are well aware of how the political mood of society changes after sharp turns in history. Moreover, let’s not forget that the European elections will take place against the background of an unprecedented migration crisis, when every citizen of Europe will see new Ukrainian refugees on the streets of their hometown. And what will they have to choose to avoid repeating their fate? Will it be confrontation or coexistence with a potential aggressor?

The political landscape of the Czech Republic, especially until 2022, in the times of Miloš Zeman and Andrej Babiš, reminds us that changes can occur here without any major shifts in a pro-Russian direction as well. The situation in Poland is, of course, not so simple. However, even now, political forces determined to block aid to Ukraine, such as the Confederation, are managing to dictate their agenda to the entire country and the two major parties in Poland, even without high-profile parliamentary success or participation in a coalition.

Imagine a Polish voter after the collapse of Ukraine and against the backdrop of migration problems that will be many times greater in Poland than in neighboring countries as a result of this collapse. And let’s realize that no one will be able to guarantee the preservation of Poland determined to rebuff Russian political encroachment under such circumstances.

But the problems of the countries of Central Europe will be even greater if the pro-Russian forces — let’s mockingly call them “peace parties” — increase their influence in leading European Union countries such as Germany, France, Italy, or the Netherlands. Such forces already exist in these countries, and their rating allows us to talk about possible success in the event of destabilization of the international situation. And let’s not forget that the leaders of these far-right or far-left parties are also ardent Eurosceptics.

So it will not only be about the desire to come to terms with the Kremlin, but also about a determined reformatting of the European project. That is, about security and money for the countries of Central Europe. Which will correspondingly only increase their drift towards Moscow.

“Greater Hungary”? That’s an understatement!

So when we talk about the survival and success of Ukraine, we must emphasize that Europeans must contribute to this survival and success not only for our sake, but also for their good. Because as a result of our defeat, we will see neither the Ukraine we dream of nor the Europe we know.

Vitaliy Portnikov, specially for Infopost.Media

🇺🇦 Ця колонка доступна також українською мовою: Поразка Європи

* This text is an op-ed which means that it primarily reflects the opinions of the author, which may not coincide with the position of the InfoPost editorial board. We publish op-eds primarily for the sake of discussion around important topics, as we believe in the power of public dialog. If you would like to write an op-ed for us, please contact us at editor.infopost@gmail.com

** The publication was prepared within the framework of the Re:Open Ukraine project, implemented with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the International Renaissance Foundation.